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ARTICLES
GENOCIDE AND THE EROTICIZATION
OF DEATH: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND
MORAL PURITY
TAWIAANSAHt

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

THE NEXT GENOCIDE: PRACTICAL INVESTMENTS

As I write this, the world's attention is focused on the war against
terrorism and the war in Iraq. Somewhere in Africa, a government has
been accused of aiding and abetting the slaughter of its own people by the
hundreds and driving thousands of several maligned minorities out of their
homeland, to face rape and assault by marauding militia (partly government
sponsored) and the certainty of starvation, suffering, and death at the hands
of their ~ersecutors. 1 Darfur, Sudan has slowly entered the lexicon of
genocide, to be added to a list that includes Srebrenica, Kigali, Kosovo,
and long before these, Auschwitz and Kharput.

t B.A., M.A., Columbia University; LL.B., University of Toronto; Ph.D., Columbia University.
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Chase, Anne Acton, and Theresa Sullivan. For comments, criticisms, and suggestions regarding earlier
drafts of the article, I thank Barbara Stark, Judi Greenberg, Robert Clark, David Mithen, Joelle Moreno,
Peter Manus, Allison Dussais, and Anthony Anghie. For help with the larger project, of which this
Article is a part, I thank David Darnrosch, Julie Peters, Kendall Thomas, Andreas Huyssens, Jean
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Gardiner. I am grateful to the New England School of Law for its support.
1
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Darfar Destroyed, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports
/2004/sudan0504 (last visited June 23, 2004).
The government of Sudan is responsible for 'ethnic cleansing' and crimes against humanity
in Darfur, one of the world's poorest and most inaccessible regions, on Sudan's western
border with Chad. The Sudanese government and the Arab 'Janjaweed' militias it arms and
supports have committed numerous attacks on the civilian populations of the African Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups.... The government and its Janjaweed allies have killed
thousands of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa-often in cold blood, raped women, and destroyed
villages, food stocks and other supplies essential to the civilian population. They have
driven more than one million civilians, mostly farmers, into camps and settlements in Darfur
where they live on the very edge of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses. More than
110,000 others have fled to neighboring Chad but the vast majority of war victims remain
trapped in Darfur.
Diocese of Pueblo, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western
Sudan, available at http://www.dioceseofpueblo.com/pastorallife/mc/darfur_ destroyed.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2005).
2
See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Magboula Brush With Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A23.
"Ms. Khattar ... part of a wave of 1.2 million people left homeless by the genocide in Darfur." Id.
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Darfur's entry is typical of modern-day instances of genocide. It
begins, for us in the West, with what some have called the "semantic
debate"3 : is this really genocide?4 We need to know, because once an event
is called by that name, it has a definable and recognizable shape and entails
specific legal duties which include an obligation, on the part of the
international community, to intervene because of genocide's threat to
international "peace and security. " 5
The failure and distraction of the semantic debate as a pragmatic
vehicle for intervention has recently been noted, not least within the
context of Darfur. 6 Nevertheless, the genocide debate may be important for
another reason: the word carries emotional, moral, and historical weight. It
is conceivable that Darfur would have remained on the margins of the
world's consciousness were the events there characterized as "massive
violations of human rights," in the more clinical language of the United
Nations. 7 Although the word "genocide" may indeed be enervated by its
application to sundry events that commentators continue to debate8-and
In July 2004, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur a genocide. Then, in
early September, after reviewing the results of an innovative government-sponsored
investigation, Secretary of State Colin Powell also used the term and President George W.
Bush followed suit in a speech to the United Nations several weeks later-the first times
such senior U.S. government officials had ever conclusively applied the term to a current
crisis and invoked the convention.
Scott Straus, Darfar and the Genocide Debate, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123, 123 (Jan./Feb. 2005).
3
Unnamed Student, Phrase Used in Professor Kathleen Hamill's "International Human Rights Law and
Policy" course at the Fletcher School at Tufts University in Response to a Panel Discussion Entitled
"Crisis in Sudan: The Failure to Respond" held on July 7, 2004 at the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University (July 8, 2004).
4
See, e.g., Marc Lacey, In Darfar. Appalling Atrocity, But Is That Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2004, atA3.
5
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 278.
6
See Straus, supra note 2, at 124.
So far, the convention has proven weak. Having been invoked, it did not-<:ontrary to
expectations--electrify international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Instead, the UN Security
Council commissioned further studies ... Darfur has shown that the energy spent fighting
over whether to call the events there 'genocide' was misplaced, overshadowing difficult but
more important questions about how to craft an effective response to mass violence against
civilians in Sudan.
Id.
7
Id. at 130.
Meanwhile, other world leaders and opinion makers continued to show reticence about
calling Darfur 'genocide.' EU, Canadian, and British officials all avoided the term, as did
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was pilloried in the media for limiting his
description of Darfur to 'massive violations of human rights.' Human Rights Watch and the
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Samantha Power favored the slightly less charged term 'ethnic
cleansing,' arguing that Darfur involved the forced removal of an ethnic group, not its
deliberate extermination, and that genocide is hard to prove in the midst of a crisis.
Id.
8
Kosovo is a controversial case in point, where some view NATO's military intervention as justified on
the basis of curtailing or preventing genocide by the Milosevic government, and others contest the
application of the term and, as such, the use of force in that instance. See generally ALEXANDER
COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, IMPERIAL CRUSADES: IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND YUGOSLAVIA (2004)
(arguing that the bombs dropped on Serbia and Kosovo had less to do with humanitarianism and more
with realpolitik).
It's plain too that the US and its NATO subordinates wanted a confrontation and ultimately
forced it. It's also clear that increasingly vocal and explicit charges by the Russians that the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was supplied by the Germans and the CIA have merit. The
KLA itself was roundly denounced-before the bombings-in the London Times as a Maoist
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to date the use of the term has not brought about intervention in
Sudan -it still garners attention, if only for a moment.
Genocide is a legal term whose deployment carries political, cultural,
and moral implications. It is a juridical vessel for a number of
specifications: morality and notions of evil, ethics and the instrumental (or
political) nature of representation, lived event (what "actually" happened),
and how things are narrated and remembered (the felt cultural, political,
and moral needs of the perpetrators and victims, as well as the witnesses).
As Straus puts it, "Genocide is a contested concept: there is much
disagreement about what qualifies for the term." 10
Darfur provides two lessons at once: first, as the next genocide, it
imbibes all the past instances, questions and critiques them, even as it cries
for direct address in its own specific historical and political context.
Second, as the next genocide, it irradiates outwards, outside itself, as a
discourse; when we situate Darfur in the global-historical moment next to
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Tamil Tigers, Abu Ghraib, and so on, we glimpse an
understanding of our relationship to what we consider evil, what we "do"
about it, who receives attention and why, and so on. In short, Darfur
presses us to think about two related ways of seeing an event: in pragmatic
or practical terms, and in abstract or philosophical terms. In the first place,
people are dying: what do we do to stop this from happening, if anything?
The answer to questions of activity entails the production of practical and
strategic knowledge. In the second place, people are being killed: what is
my connection to these events? Who are they to me, and who am I in
relation to them and their suffering? The answer to questions such as these
produces speculative and philosophical information. These questions
attempt to excavate our active and specular investments in relation to their
suffering and their destruction.
Activists and practitioners are impatient 11 with the questions that
produce speculative knowledge, holding that to speculate about "being"
and "existence" while people are being massacred and hounded from their
homes is distracting or perverse. This is true, even or especially in the
instant case. Yet, in order to persuade their leaders to act, activists require a
gang fueled by heroin-trafficking. . . . So the NATO bombs began to fall and, exactly as
could have been predicted, the Serbian brutalities in Kosovo escalated and the tidal wave of
refugees began. Everything has gone according to the script.
Id. at 7.
9
See Straus, supra note 2, at 131. "The genocide debate and the Darfur crisis are thus instructive for
several reasons. First, they have made it clear that 'genocide' is not a magic word that triggers
intervention." Id.
10
Straus, supra note 2, at 132. Straus continues with a discussion of the two elements that are most
contested with respect to the meaning of the term: what constitutes the "group" being destroyed (that is
to say, "how much 'partial' group destruction does it take to reach the genocide threshold?"), and the
problem of determining the perpetrator's intent "in the midst of a crisis." Id. Whereupon Straus notes,
"the indeterminacy makes genocide a difficult term around which to mobilize an international coalition
for intervention." Id.
11
See, e.g., Samantha Power, Dying in Darfar: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped?, THE
NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2004, at 56. "In the meantime [whilst states resist calling the crisis in Darfur a
genocide], the debate over semantics has only further distracted the international community from the
more important debate about how to save lives." Id. at 72.
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vehicle that tells the actors it is politically expedient, morally advisable, or
legally required that they act. In short, they need a theory. My point is that
when the action is largely, if not exclusively, "contained" in the legal boxthat is, one cannot act, notwithstanding one's moral instinct to the contrary,
unless one's actions are legal, or arguably (as in the case of Kosovo), unless
the act can be legitimated (sometimes ex post facto)-then the theory
behind the legality of action in the face of a genocide becomes critical.
Genocide, then, is the legal term (derived from international law) that
enables us to act in the face of massive human suffering. But the law also
enables us to stand still. This is the substance of the semantic debate: if
Darfur is defined as a genocide, legally we have a duty to intervene. If not,
we may stand still and, indeed, as happened in Rwanda, stand down when
the slaughtering begins. But behind the semantics and the impatience,
behind the will to intervene or not to intervene, lies a discourse of
practicality and expediency: is it feasible? Do we have economic or
political interests at stake? And beneath even this level of address lies
something else: the peculiar hold of the specular. Herein lurk dark hints
about ourselves, intimated in that secret sense, barely confessed to
ourselves and quickly suppressed, that "Those savages are at it again," or "I
couldn't look at the pictures of these broken children, those raped and
forlorn women, and yet I couldn't tum away either." The law enables us to
escape these secret buried hints; in a sense, the law enables an escape from
ourselves. It is all about those poor, wretched people dying, and the need to
chide ourselves, through the law, into moral action. 12
Critiquing the law on genocide involves a risk. People are being killed;
the object of critique, therefore, should be to produce instrumental
information that will enable us to act-"what can we do to save them, to
stop this, today?" 13 But I submit that despite the dichotomy between
practice and theory, both practical and speculative information are, in the
final analysis, instrumental. How is theory instrumental? When we see
that the semantic debate is really asking what is reposed within the law,
what the law as a vessel contains, we realize that it expresses more than
legal entailments: the law, as the discursive determinant of how we see an
event, is mythopoeic. It generates and resolves (or attempts to) all those
ambivalent fears, hopes, and desires in relation to dead bodies and forlorn
victims. It contains, and therefore quiets, ambiguous political, historical,
and cultural difficulties. In short, the law as a vessel defines the self in
relation to the other across the borderline called genocide: how I define
what is happening to those humans dying in a faraway country defines me
in relation to them, me as both construct and projection in relation to the
other. The discourse on genocide, in short, is a project or a myth-system 14
12

See Straus, supra note 2, at 129. "The [Genocide C]onvention had never been tested, however, and
the law is in fact ambiguous on what 'undertaking to prevent' and 'suppressing' genocide actually mean
and who is to carry out such measures." Id.
13
See id. at 124 (describing U.N. commissioned studies and vague threats, which have not proven
effective in stopping the violence).
14
Like Edward W. Said's Orienta/ism, the discourse of genocide is "a myth-system with a mytho-logic,
rhetoric, and institutions of its own. It is a machine for producing statements" about an event in relation
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that produces knowledge about the self. But when we see the law as
discursive (as, indeed, the semantic debate), we understand that law as
repository of self-projection is a means of producing a certain kind of self
and escaping another: this is a self defined according to whether or not she
does or does not have legal duties. The self as ambivalent, 15 torn,
discordant, opaque, is resolved in the clarity of the rational, juridical self.
But how is knowledge of the self that is elucidated by a critique of the
law "instrumental" in terms of what to do about the dying out there? I
suggest that critique allows us to see that escaping from the self is also a
means of escaping from a view of the self implicated in those actions far
away, as somehow invested in the death and depredation "out there." In
other words, the critical project is instrumental because if we are really
interested in saving lives, in doing something, not just in the instant caseand the instant case is always too late, always peripheral-but also in the
future, then we need to move beyond the (borderline of) innocence 16 vested
in us by the juridical self, which essentially casts us in the role of
bystanders engaged in a semantic debate, or saviors intervening to rescue
both lives and consciences. But investment in the life of the other means,
in effect, that the self must excavate and confront the deep, conflicted and,
indeed, largely unconscious desire for the destruction of the other. The self
confronts the sense that that destruction (thanatos) is a febrile, sacramental
and, I will argue, erotic engine and source of the self's creative project
(eros).
Thus, to the practitioner's impatient question concerning Darfur: "What
can we do to save lives now, today?" one must also add another question:
Will the deployment of any of the practical options at hand (get the UN
involved, get the lawyers and the military on standby) ensure that if there is
another Darfur I will be able to ask, "What can I do to save lives now,
today?" In other words, what is our investment in genocide?
B.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The object of this Article is to look more closely at the discourse on
genocide, the juridical narrative that has been created around instances of
mass violence that have involved the application of the term as a legal
referent. Stated simply, my purpose in critiquing the discourse on genocide
is to engender a disinvestment in the death of others. I analyze the
discourse as a form of conflict management at two levels of investment: the
to, and regardless of its ultimate definition as, genocide. POWER, POLITICS, AND CULTURE: INTERVIEWS
WITH EDWARD W. SAID 36 (Gauri Viswanathan ed., 2001) [hereinafter SAID].
15
See generally DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). See infra Part II.A and note 48 for a discussion of Kennedy's stories of
moral ambivalence, uncertainty, and "resolution" within narrative.
16
I use the term "border(s) of innocence" as a metaphor to denote how discourse, particularly of the law
(the juridical), functions in part to create a severance between the self, the one that sits in judgment, the
one observing and constructing the object or event, and the other or the event itself. "Innocence"
suggests both my non-complicity in the event (violence of the other), as well as my naivete,
bewilderment, and incomprehension when faced with the annihilatory violence of the other, i.e., its
foreignness to me. This "border" is a construct (cordon sanitaire) driven in part by a deep and libidinal
(desiring) will to moral purity, as I discuss in this Article.
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individual and the state. Pursuant to a prescription for Darfur today, or
indeed for what we could or should have done in Kosovo or Nyarubuye
yesterday, I hope to provide in the following pages a reflection on what we
mean by genocide, what investments are involved, how we have
constructed our narratives, our world, such that these investments and their
tenebrous consequences seem inevitable and inescapable, how we appear to
ourselves to be powerless in the face of rampant death and destruction out
there in the world. By extension, I posit a critique of a legal system and
legal/political prescriptions that render our narrative of genocide stable and
inevitable.
To be sure, we suffer when we see photograp!is of the victims, ravaged
and emaciated. But that's the point: as Slavoj Zizek has noted, we hold
different libidinal investments between suffering "here" and suffering
"there," suggesting that the latter is represented as more real, in a sense,
and therefore more necessary. 17 The nameless Japanese man in Alain
Resnais's Hiroshima Mon Amour 18 makes a similar point to his lover, the
nameless French woman, who believes she knows Hiroshima from what
she has seen (e.g., hospitals, museums, Peace Square, newsreels)-"! saw
everything. Everythin&." He replies, over and over, "You saw nothing in
Hiroshima. Nothing."
Almost daily we are fed a diet of images of ravaged and emaciated
victims of crises somewhere else, in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or South
America, and we think we see "everything," that we know ourselves
through and against these images. My point will be that within such stories
are intimated the creation of the borders between self and other that make
the other's destruction seem insoluble, render my pity and horror futile, and
justify, indeed require, my redemptive intervention (use of force).
But I will also argue that the question of our libidinal investment is not
the creation of the border itself; on the contrary, a borderless world, after
all, is a world gone mad. 20 Borders, as Miroslav Volf notes, can also be
17

See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL! FIVE ESSAYS ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND
RELATED DATES 13 (2002).
And the same 'derealization' [as in The Truman Show] of the horror went on after the WTC
collapse: while the number of victims-3,000--is repeated all the time, it is surprising how
little of the actual carnage we see-no dismembered bodies, no blood, no desperate faces of
dying people ... in clear contrast to reporting on Third World catastrophes, where the whole
point is to produce a scoop of some gruesome detail: Somalis dying of hunger, raped
Bosnian women, men with their throats cut. These shots are always accompanied by an
advance warning that 'some of the images you will see are extremely graphic and may upset
children'-a warning which we never heard in the reports on the WTC collapse. Is this not
yet further proof of how, even in this tragic moment, the distance which separates Us from
Them, from their reality, is maintained: the real horror happens there, not here?
Id.
18
HIROSHIMA MON AMOUR (Criterion Collection 1959).
19
Id. This is during the long sequence at the beginning of the film. With respect to newsreels, she says,
inter alia: "The films have been made as authentically as possible. The illusion, it's quite simple, the
illusion is so perfect that the tourists cry. One can always scoff, but what else can a tourist do, really,
but cry? I've always wept over the fate of Hiroshima. Always." He says, "No. What would you have
cried about?" Later, interrupting her monologue on the films, "You saw nothing. Nothing."
20
MIROSLAV VOLF, EXCLUSION & EMBRACE: A THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF IDENTITY, OTHERNESS,
AND RECONCILIATION 90-91 (1996). "The formation and negotiation of identity always entails the
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bridges to the other. Within the discourse on genocide, which is all about
destruction, lies the possibility that the very thing that separates us from
them-that requires us to see their suffering and to see it as more real and,
as such, as the limit of my self-extension (in an act of redemption, saving
them)-also unites us. The analysis becomes, in short, a function of
reconceptualizing the borders themselves.
The borders of innocence are the narratives and ways of seeing that
constitute the discourse on genocide. What is evil, and who am I in relation
to it? In the following, I will suggest that the discourse is a means of
managing the world and categorizing the humans within it.
In discussing the Nazi program of extermination, Alain Badiou notes
that whereas evil exists, "there is no radical Evil."21 Evil as "a category not
of the human animal, but of the subject," he explains, must be understood
with reference to "the intrinsic dimensions of the process of political
truth."22 As such, evil is taken out of conceptions of natural law (biology),
as well as divorced from its "obviously religious origins.'m This is not to
deny the singularity of the Holocaust, but rather "to situate [localiser] this
singularity" within human history and subjectivity.24
David Kennedy describes what happens to the situatedness of events
within certain narratives. Although the story he tells concerns the alleged
abuse of political prisoners by the Uruguayan government in the 1980s, it is
illustrative of the discursive mechanisms applicable to any human rights
event, including events described as genocide.
Kennedy and his colleagues first meet a prison warden named Papillon,
then the prisoner, a woman named Ana. In reporting on these meetings,
Kennedy struggles with their meaning as situated narrative: "I could tell a
story about 'humm1 rights abuses in Uruguay and the work of private
institutions to combat them,'" he begins, suggesting also a situatedness
having to do with "the rhythmic ebb and flow of the rule of law," or "[t]he
process of Uruguayan 'democratization,"' or "a narrative about social
struggle or foreign relations. "25 Then Kennedy notes the following:
For all this potential narrative variety, however, it seems that no
matter which story I tell, our moment with Ana is bound to be
rendered too lucid, its own ambiguity lost to history. The difficulty
is that both the analysis and the activism respond to narrative
demands. Both enterprises struggle against the confusion of
moments like ours with Ana, continuously creating new
ambiguities and confusions. Although one point of a story like this
one is to remember what was put aside in our moment with Ana,
drawing of boundaries, the setting of the self as distinct from the other. As Gillian Rose puts it in Loves
Work, 'a soul that is unbound is as mad as one with cemented borders."' Id.
21
ALAIN BADIOU ETHICS: AN UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL 66 (Peter Hallward trans., Verso 2001).
22
Id. at 66.
23
Id. at 58.
24
Id. at 64. "One of the singularities of Nazi politics was its precise proclamation of the historical
community that was to be endowed with a conquering subjectivity. And it was this proclamation that
enabled its subjective victory, and put extermination on the agenda." Id. at 65.
25
KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 40.
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the telling reinforces a deeper social practice of conflict
management: we defer coming to terms with the confusion of the
moment by embroidering it into the fabric of numerous comforting
stories. 26
As Kennedy's analysis of the "dark side" of humanitarianism suggests,
if the "ordinary" human rights event is ambiguous and confusing, such that
it is situated "by embroidering it into the fabric of numerous comforting
stories,"27 now much more will this be true of a massive program of
extermination, such as the Nazi Holocaust or the Rwandan and Bosnian
genocides? It is at the point of the situatedness of an event within a
narrative of desire and suppression, management and deflection, that I wish
to posit an analogy. I suggest a parallel operation, regarding what Kennedy
terms the "narrative demands" that reinforce the "deeper social practice of
conflict management," between the individual, psychic level on the one
hand, and on the other, the "management" of sovereignty (the sovereign
self) by the state within, by and through the international legal system. 28
The similarity between the two-individual and state-revolves around
the function of law as the repository of a narrative, if you will, of stability, a
"comforting story" of rationality and safety. This is the content of the
"semantic debate" regarding genocide as a juridical discourse. The law, for
both self and sovereign, manages the ambiguities and reinforces the social
practice of conflict management. For the self, the law does this by
containing (and resolving) the duty of moral action or inaction in the face
of the other's suffering; the law alienates the self from that suffering, in
part through the specular fixation on suffering as other. To understand a
similar operation of the law at the level of the state, one must recall the idea
or conceptualization of sovereignty as both dichotomized and
contradictory. As Martti Koskenniemi explains it, "modem doctrine
constantly oscillates between an ascending and a descending perspective on
statehood; " 29 that is, the choice between a conception of sovereignty as
either before or after the law. To grossly simplify a complex problem: if
the sovereign comes after the law (law anterior to the sovereign), then the
law "manages" and constrains the sovereign, including as such the political
will, which itself includes the sovereign's appetite for imperialism. If, on
the other hand, the state as sovereign is anterior to the law, then the
international legal system is in effect the will of the state, spoken by it. In
any event, under either theory, it may be posited that a state will perceive
itself, qua the imperialist appetite (non-equality of states or, simply, the
question of power), as either constrained by or constraining the rule of law
(international legal system). There is an inevitable enmeshment between
Id.
Id.
28
See id.
29
MARITI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 193 (1989). Koskenniemi also refers to the "mutual exclusivity" of these two conceptions
as empiricism versus conceptualism, the "legal approach" (sovereign under law) versus the "pure fact
approach" (law ultimately the will of the sovereign), with Hans Kelsen, the principal advocate of the
former (the "utopianism" in the title of Koskenniemi's book), and Carl Schmitt, the advocate of the
latter (the "apologism," i.e., for state power as the ultimate "source of validity"). See id. at 194-200.
26

21
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sovereignty and law, but even if the question of the relationship cannot be
resolved by resort to either theory of sovereignty, the choice of one
perspective over another will have consequences for the situatedness of the
political, extrinsic event. Calling an event genocide, then, implicates the
sovereignty of the redemptive and the recalcitrant states in question.
Genocide, then, involves the issue of conflict management at two
levels. Analogous to the individual confronted with the trauma of the
external event-managed by a narrative of juridical alienation from the
violence and displacement of the self's own aggressivity as other (libidinal
or erotic investment), the juridical is also the site of the state's stability
when its sovereignty is under threat (i.e., external crisis as a threat or crisis
with respect to international peace and security). If, then, the international
arena is characterized by what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the
"omni-crisis,"30 then this must involve both the threat to and stabilization
(ratification) of the sovereign, i.e., the meaning of sovereignty within the
redemptive act. In a sense, then, both individual psyche as a "subject" of
the self, and sovereignty as the state's subjectivity under or through
international law, are invested in systemic crisis as both materially and
discursively exteriorized.
As Kennedy notes, juridical narrative as an instance of conflict
management-of ambivalent psychic projections as much as imperialist
drives or hungers-both creates the ambivalences it attem}?ts to resolve and
The juridical
reinforces the tracks or the patterns of management.
narrative, therefore, coheres with an idea of imperialism itself as
functionally a cycle of the creation and resolution of conflict. As Hardt and
Negri point out in their discussion of the "new" post-imperial or modem
sovereign, "the expansion of Empire is rooted in the internal trajectory of
the conflicts it is meant to resolve." 32 Hardt and Negri go on to point out
that "[t]he first task of Empire, then, is to enlarge the realm of the
consensuses that support its power. "33
Thus, if we agree with modem theorists that the nature and extent of
the widespread conflicts throughout the world since the end of the Cold
War have inaugurated a new kind of superpower sovereignty, whereby the
United States is called upon to exercise the law, or to manage conflicts
either pursuant to or regardless of the law (the "state of exception"34 that
permits the sovereign under threat to suspend the law, and in a sense to

30

See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 189 (2000). "The end of the crisis of modernity
has given rise to a proliferation of minor and indefinite crises, or, as we prefer, to an omni-crisis." Id.
31
See generally KENNEDY, supra note 15.
32
HARDT & NEGRJ, supra note 30, at 15.
33 Id.
34
See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5
(George Schwab trans., MIT 1985) (1922). "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. Only this
definition can do justice to a borderline concept." Id. See also Giorgio Agamben, Generation Online,
The State of Emergency, at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2004). Agamben notes that "(t]he state of emergency [i.e., the suspension of law] defines a regime
of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts
that do not have the value oflaw acquire the force oflaw."
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operate above the law to redeem the world35), then we can apprehend the
discourse of genocide as "internal" conflict management, as resembling
and replicating the imperial dimensions (or at least the imperialist appetite
in such conflict management) of a discourse of "external" management of
the omni-crisis that sustains the sovereign's existence. 36 The story of the
omni-crisis as implicated in the sustenance of sovereignty and, in tum, the
strong and secure modem state, is both the rational deduction of the theory
of sovereignty, whether before or after the law, but depends for its existence
or reality on the "management" of a suppressed and displaced "irrational"
and the creation of a libidinal investment in that displacement/management.
Another way of characterizing the rational displacement of (self-)
aggressivity is to consider that the perverse and secret rush we get from
knowing that we are safe from "that horror, out there" is something like the
rush of recognition that our safety is in some, perhaps highly (or not so
highly) attenuated sense, a consequence of "that horror, out there." 37 The
resort to moral action, unexceptionable as it may be is also at base an
exercise of power with all the ambivalence that entails. 318
I posit, therefore, a parallel between the modem sovereign and the self,
and suggest that a critique of the borders of innocence created by
externalization is also a critique of the legal system that maintains them.
The object must be to discomfort, as it were the "comforting stories," to
unravel the fabric (semantic debate) into which the external event is
embroidered. The comforting story in question is the juridical discourse on
genocide; that is, the term itself and the narrative that subtends it is, in
Kennedy's terms, a deferral of the confrontation with the ambiguity and
confusion or, more deeply, the fraught sense of shame, complicity, illicit
fascination, and finally, abjection of the event and its representation, even
as the images and stories produce, or spin, ambiguities and confusions
within the memorials-and counter-memorials-to the "singularity" of the
event. 39

35

See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and Local
in the Age ofAccountability, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 715 (2003)(review essay).
Based on its self-conception as the sole superpower and 'leader of the free world,' the United
States contends that it plays an exceptional role in enforcing international Jaw through the
use of armed force, and that it must not be inhibited in discharging its unique responsibility
for fear of politically motivated prosecutions (or because of any other external legal
constraints, for that matter).
Id.
36
See EMMANUEL TODD, AFTER EMPIRE: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN ORDER 3 (2003).
The elevation of terrorism into a universal force institutionalizes a permanent state of war
across the globe-a fourth 'World War' according to certain American authors who see
nothing ridiculous about considering the Cold War as the third. Everything seems to indicate
that the United States is, for some obscure reason, trying to maintain a certain level of
international tension, a situation of limited but permanent war.
Id.
37
See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 90 (Doubleday 1997) (1899), for a famous literary
rendition of that moment of recognition spoken by Kurtz: "The horror! The horror!"
38
See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 15. "Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on
the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace." Id.
39
See generally KENNEDY, supra note 15.
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Genocide, as a discourse, is redemptive. This is the essence of
Samantha Power's powerful critique of U.S. foreign policy in the wake of
genocide: the absence of a forceful response is a moral failure. 40 But the
capacity to use force, its index within the equation of ethical action, is but
one, albeit crucial, element of the sovereign's legitimacy: the sovereign is
implicated within the genocide. The sovereign is called into being by
crises, 41 none more so than the instantiation of genocide. It is this
knowledge, this "ambiguity42 and confusion," that sits at the heart of ethical
action, and that analogizes the logic of imperialism, the demands of
narration, and the self's conceptualization of an event described as
genocide.
This Article, then, examines the latent eroticism beneath the
redemptive juridical discourse through a comparative analysis of the self,
on the one hand, and the sovereign on the other, in their relationship to the
external event or crisis. I wish to examine the extent to which there is a
pleasurable or erotic43 element, or rush, on the psychic level for the
individual self, or an investment-for the state in the source of its validity
(meaning of sovereignty)-that inheres in the suffering of the other. My
goal is to provoke the reader to question an international legal system that
recharges and perpetuates the subconscious desire for mass violence as a
means of verifying the moral purity of those who are not personally subject
40

See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE

poo2).
1

See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 16. Both the supranational analogy (the international legal
system) and the domestic legal order operate on the same terrain: the terrain of crisis. See id. "As Carl
Schmitt has taught us, however, crisis on the terrain of the application of law should focus our attention
on the 'exception' operative in the moment of its production." Id. Domestic and supranational law are
both defined by their exceptionality. Exceptionality in turn is defined as follows: it means that the
intervening authority is granted:
(1) the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of intervention;
and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be
applied to the diversity and the plurality of the arrangements in crisis. Here, therefore, is
born, in the name of the exceptionality of the intervention, a form of right that is really a
right of the police . ... The judicial power to rule over the exception and the capacity to
deploy police force are thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model of
authority.
Id. at 16--17. As can be seen, whether one speaks of the modem nation state, the superpower
ifegemon), or of"Empire" as a supranational state, the same juridical operation or gesture entails.
I do not wish to push the analogy too far, since, in any event, Kennedy's conceptualization of
ambiguity is more complex than simply that which is deferred or suppressed by the narration of
experience, to wit:
[A]ctivism avoids ambiguity by reference to an analysis that treats the ambiguity as having
already been resolved in action. Yet, just as the patterns we embroider onto our relations are
undone when the ambiguity of the experience is recaptured, so the ambiguity of our analyses
is belied by the felt authenticity of our experiences. Oddly, this work-weaving meaning
into our lives only to rip out the cloth-is forgotten, and the story seems simply to unfold, to
progress. Propelled forward by our practice and reimagined by our analysis, time seems to
move forward independent of our activities. Moreover, as we forget the ambiguity of our
play, the results of our activities come to seem real.
KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 51. What I hope to suggest by the analogy between narration and
imperialism is simply a logic of crisis that situates the discourses on genocide, or the discourse of
genocide, within the unconscious, the dream-world, or more precisely the "internal trajectory" of global
power dynamics, whether these dynamics are called old state-centric imperialism, new Empire,
supranationalism, or globalism. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 15.
43
See GEORGES BATAILLE, EROTICISM: DEATH AND SENSUALITY 16 (Mary Dalwood trans., John Calder
1962) (1957). "In essence, the domain of eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation." Id.
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to the threat of genocide or the moral exceptionalism (sovereign as "he who
decides on the exception"44 ) of the third party state. 45
When we perceive the violence "out there," remote from ourselves, it
may, on a material level, have little to do with us. But its existence has
psychic weight that bears upon the meaning of our lived experience here in
the safety of our home. The meaning can be expressed as a kind of
investment in the existence of that violence, out there; this is the content of
the "eroticism" that explains the relation of the self to the other, who is
composed of violence and suffering across the border or zone of innocence,
the meaning and substance of the juridical self.
I attempt in this Article to reclaim the erotic from its specular fixation
on the other's death. As a critique of our libidinal investments (eroticism),
the project hopes, by extension, to critique the legal system that ratifies
them by examining the construction of the self and the sovereign at the
limits of law and politics. The paradigmatic case for this, I suggest, is the
case of genocide; the point at which the self, at a distance, observes the
enactment of the final resolution of the self-other antagonism.
The Article is divided into three parts. In the first, I outline and explain
what I mean by eroticism, or the "libidinal investment." In the second, I
explain the meaning of the erotic as a disciplinary device in relation to the
other's death. I examine the erotic as the juridical border that maintains
and polices the rational or stabilized self (and sovereign), and propose two
means of escape from the inevitability of the eroticism-death complex,
indexed as the political and the moral/ethical.
In the result, I hope to posit a "neutral space" within which the self (or
sovereign) may discover itself, its antagonism. 46 That is, within the neutral
space, the self encounters the other not as the displacement of its own
violence, but as the site of its alterity (its sense of otherness). As such, law
would function as the limit of politics (war by other means) and of the
sovereign self (or state) when its normative base (its ontology) is no longer
the exception or the crisis. I concede that for both sovereign and self this
may be a difficult prospect, since it requires a different perception, or
reconfiguration, of the border-as-law that maintains the sense (or myth) of
security. But unless we reclaim the erotic as the domain of human
connection and community-the will to love-we cannot, in a globalized
world, long remain unscathed by the suffering "out there," nor without
increasingly high cost, maintain the myth of moral purity.

44

45

SCHMITf, supra note 34, at 5.

I am grateful to my colleague Peter Manus for his editing suggestions for this introduction. Errors
and infelicities are my own.
46
See ZIZEK, supra note 17, at 66. "The actual universality is not the never-won neutral space of
translation from one particular culture to another, but, rather, the violent experience of how, across the
cultural divide, we share the same antagonism." Id.
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EROTICISM

NOTHINGNESS AND THE FATALITY OF FUSION

I read in a book today that chance, desire, fear, and death leave men and
women face to face, alone. 47
In this section, I hope to clarify the internal psychic drives, the erotic
dimension of the ethical self and its relationship to the death and suffering
of others. I will show how the legal system, by accommodating and
projecting these libidinal investments in the face of crisis, sustains and is
sustained by these forces as an externalization and normalization of them.
The "ambiguity and confusion" referred to by Kennedy that slips from
the narration (activism, analysis, representation) of event (or lived
experience) lies, in a sense, at the heart of ethical action48 or "ethical
consistency."49 In simple terms, the ethical is the struggle, as Slavoj Zizek
has noted, not between existence and nonexistence, but rather between
existence and "insistence," essentially a "striving toward existence."50 The
ethical insistence is an encounter with nothingness, the gap between action
and inaction, the aftermath of the pause, wherein memory is a "permanent
doubting. " 51
But the analysis of the relationship between memory and nothingness
is rich and ancient. Artists routinely speak of "negative space," the absence
that allows a figure to stand out in stark relief. 52 So it is with the borderline
between self and other. As Badiou points out in his analysis of evil, "the
most intense subjective sufferings-those that really highlight what is
involved in 'hurting someone,' and often lead to suicide or murder-have
as their horizon the existence of a process of love." 53 As Bataille has noted
in his study of death and sensuality, at the heart of that fraught relationship
47

LA CAPTNE (Image Entertainment 2000). Ariane, the female character, speaks these words to Simon
in the car after he has dragged her out of a post-concert gathering with her friends at the opera house.
48
Kennedy's advocacy, his hope, "is that we will come to embrace the human side of humanitarian
practice, including its dark sides, uncertainties, and ambivalences. Responsible humanitarian action in a
cloud of uncertainty-my hope is that humanitarian advocates and policy makers will develop an
appetite for this most basic experience of rulership." Kennedy, supra note 15, at xxv-xxvi. My
concern, in this article, is with the extent to which the "dark side" of our virtuous instincts in fact
creates, or contributes to the creation and perpetration of, the conditions of rule.
49
See BADIOU, supra note 21, at 60.
50
ZIZEK, supra note 17, at 22.
[T]hat which does not exist, continues to insist, striving towards existence.... When I miss
a crucial ethical opportunity, and fail to make a move that would 'change everything,' the
very nonexistence of what I should have done will haunt me for ever: although what I did
not do does not exist, its spectre continues to insist.
Id.
51
See JULIA KRISTEVA, REVOLT, SHE SAID 101 (Brian O'Keefe trans., 2002). "What Plato and St.
Augustine referred to as memory was a permanent doubting. Its essential aspect is nothingness, from
Heidegger to Sartre. The question of nothingness is essential as an aspect of freedom. But what is the
meaning of nothingness: the possibility to rebel, to change and to transform." Id.
52
"She keeps thinking, for some reason, about the professor in her art-history class. Going on and on
about negative space, how sculpture is about the skin, that edge where substance and absence meet.
How the presence of empty space, a void, causes a solid object to reveal itself." Judy Budnitz, Miracle,
THE NEW YORKER, July 12 & 19, 2004, at 87.
53
BADIOU, supra note 21, at 66.
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is the fatality of fusion, the quest for continuity between discontinuous
beings. 54
Perhaps counterintuitively, the paradoxical desire for fusion is a dream
of the sovereign, described by Hardt and Negri as the "immediacy"
between ruler and ruled. 55 Postmodemism conceives of immediacy as a
break from the law; Michel Foucault, for instance, admonishes us to
"[w]ithdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit,
castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as
a form of power and an access to reality." 56 He further suggests that we
"[p ]refer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows
over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is
productive is not sedentary but nomadic."57 Hardt and Negri's view of late
twentieth century globalism suggests the achievement of this vision. 58
I want to suggest a relationship between the Negative and immediacy:
the Negative as the law or limit means that the event out there is seen, in
stark relief, against the horizon of the desiring subject's self-projection.
That is, if there is no mediation between my desire and the source of its
production (immanent and supranational power, whereby immediacy
expresses the fusion of desire and effect59), if barriers recede to the point of
nonexistence and resurface as an insistence of the absent, then I become the
law, I am the sovereign. The material world, the suffering of th~ wretched,
is "im-mediated," meaning that it is "more real" (following Zizek) than
simply my projection. In this sense, immediacy and the "exception" (law)
become normative.
The self depends upon the insistence of that immediated reality,
violently recreated over and over again and willed as the reality, the center
of my own de-realized self. This is the dream of fusion, an encounter with
the self as the Negative. Expressed in psychoanalytic terms, the juridical,
within that dream, is cathected, i.e., over-invested. And it is this investment
in the center as the negative space, nothingness, which projects the will to
fusion and the mastery over discontinuity (discontinuous being).
54
See BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 15. "I intend to speak of these three types of eroticism in tum, to wit,
physical, emotional and religious. My aim is to show that with all of them the concern is to substitute
for the individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity." Id.
55
See generally HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30.
56
Michel Foucault, Preface to GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA xiii (Robert Hurley et al. eds., Viking Press 1977) (1972).
51
Id.
58
But see Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2002) (suggesting that the
global gay rights movement, based on an American model, is exporting a "fixed" form of (gay or
lesbian) identity to the rest of the world. As this form spreads, it excludes and suppresses a social
constructionist's more fluid and hybrid model of identity-based on a more contingent, rather than
stable, relationship between conduct and orientation/identity-which is prevalent in many parts of the
world).
59
See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 19.
We could say, in Kantian fashion, that our internal moral disposition, when it is confronted
with and tested in the social order, tends to be determined by the ethical, political, and
juridical categories of Empire. Or we could say that the external morality of every human
being and citizen is by now commensurable only in the framework of Empire. This new
framework forces us to confront a series of explosive aporias ....
Id.
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But nothingness, fusion, immediacy, and discontinuity are, in one
sense, tropes, i.e., ways of speaking about a central dilemma of the ethical
subject when faced with mass suffering and death out there in the "there,
not here." The dilemma involves a conscious will to act coupled with a
secret, dark desire to engender the conditions that in turn dictate the ethical
will to act. The projection of desire and violence can be revealed,
explained, and rationalized, in part by its refracted relationship to
imperialism or the imperialist impulse. To the extent that space and time
have been colonized by the sovereign,60 our subconscious desires are cast
such as to render my loneliness before death, and my violent, cathected
response in relation to it, inevitable and ineluctable. But through the very
tension created between nothingness and fusion, the sovereign does posit,
in Mouffe's terms, an escape from "antagonism" to "agonism."61 The self's
bordered relationship to the other is not inevitably innocent, and the self's
desire for fusion may itself permit an alternative to the sense of failure that
requires displacement, the production of a desire/abjection so normative
and rationalized as to seem inherent in the ethical act itself.
B.

LAW AND EROTICISM: A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Before discussing the alternatives to the failure of fusion, I wish to look
more closely at the nature of the eroticism that operates to center and
displace violence. I will then elaborate on the link between displacement
(de-centering) and the imperialism that characterizes one sense in which
the modern sovereign can be understood, at least as currently supported or
permitted by the international legal system. As noted, understanding the
border between self and violence is crucial to this analysis.
The juridical is the repository for my desire and investment in the
other's destruction, i.e., my investment in genocide. The juridical is a
mechanism that constrains and cabins, but also normalizes those desires.
The juridical locates the negative space at the center of the subject, what is
sometimes referred to as postmodernism's "de-centered subject."62 The
center, in turn, is the terrain of redemption. 63 The link, then, between
destruction and redemption is sacramental, the very function of the erotic. 64
In short, it is in part an eroticization of death that normalizes my
investment in the destruction of the other. I propose, therefore, to examine
this eroticization more closely as an imperialist trope.
60

See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 10-11. This "ethico-political dynamic that lies at the heart of
its juridical concept" involves "a boundless, universal space," and "all time." Id. at 11. "Empire
exhausts historical time, suspends history, and summons the past and future within its own ethical order.
In other words, Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary." Id.
61
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 4 (1999).
62
See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic, The Postmodernist Turn: Lacan, Psychoanalytic Semiotics, and the
Construction of Subjectivity in Law, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 67, 70 (1994). A tenet of postmodemism
was "the idea that the subject was not as centered and in control as prevalent ideology claimed (in fact,
the person became seen as the de-centered subject)." Id.
63
For Volf and Christian theology, decentering is not therefore descriptive but, rather, the prescription:
"Whichever way the 'centering' takes place and whatever its result, the self should be de-centered,
claims Paul. The word he uses to describe the act is 'crucified."' VOLF, supra note 20, at 70.
64
See BATAILLE, supra note 43, 15-16. "[A]ll eroticism has a sacramental character," since the aim is
"to substitute for the individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity." Id.
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To apprehend the self's investment in the law (genocide discourse) as
the repository of the displacement of the real, one may look briefly at some
devices that convey the law's operation. To examine the borders between
the self and the other that seem to make genocide "out there" inevitable,
one must delve beneath the surface, beneath the horror and fascination, to
the psychic, erotic investments produced by the borders within the context
of a will to fusion. First, the law operates by exclusions. I will discuss the
link between the constitution of the (morally pure) self via exclusions and
the disciplinary devices that exemplify this operation. 65 Second, these
devices are imperialistic, 66 which recalls the relationship between narrative
demands and imperialism's imperatives. By implication, these demands
and imperatives are inscribed within the law or the juridical response to
violence, whereupon we may say that the "truth" of genocidal violencemy relation as outside the event, my silent observation (my gaze, or "magic
eye"67 ) setting apart, in stark relief, the savagery of the other, the necessity
and inevitability of my violent intervention-resides within the juridical
mode of apprehending the event (as the real). Third, between the logic of
nothingness and the fatality of (the will to) fusion, postmodern immediacy
65

See VOLF, supra note 20, at 69-70.
Psychologists tell us that humans produce and reconfigure themselves by a process of
identifying with others and rejecting them, by repressing drives and desires, by interjecting
and projecting images of the self and the other, by externalizing fears, by fabricating
enemies and suffering animosities, by forming allegiances and breaking them up, by loving
and hating, by seeking to dominate and letting themselves be dominated-and all this not
neatly divided but all mixed up, with 'innocences' [sic] often riding on hidden 'vices,' and
'vices' seeking compensatory redemption in contrived 'virtues.'
Id. Note that this "mixed up" character of human psychic construction may be compared, but finally
opposed to, the intentional decision of the sovereign to declare the enemy and deploy the state of
emergency. See Agamben, supra note 34, at 6. On the similarities between "being," for metaphysics,
and "violence" for the sovereign:
To pure being as the ultimate stake of metaphysics, corresponds pure violence as the
ultimate stake of the political; to the onto-theological strategy that wants pure being within
the net of logos, corresponds the strategy of exception that has to secure the relation between
violence and law. It is as if law and logos would need an anomic or 'a-logic' zone of
suspension in order to found their relation to life.
Id.
66
Hardt and Negri suggest a distinction between "disciplinary society," which deploys institutional
(mediatory) devices that discipline the subject, and the "society of control," whereby disciplinarity is
engendered internally, no longer requiring external or institutional devices or dispositifs. Both societies
are imperialistic, however, the radical difference being the question of the source of discipline or selfdiscipline. See HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 30, at 23.
67
On a psychoanalytic subject struggling with a sense of insecurity and shame, Wurmser notes a
transformation that he characterizes as "the magic eye." See LEON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME
120 ( 1994). "[A] quite different inner power gradually took center stage ... a more archaic version: the
magical control by his eyes. His seeing formed, transformed, and destroyed the world." Id. Also,
"[s]eeing was ruthlessly uncovering, intruding, and demolishing." Id. at 122. But see SIGMUND FREUD,
TOTEM AND TABOO: ASSEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE PSYCHIC LIVES OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS
(A.A. Brill trans., Random House 1946) (1918) (discussing the neurotic's belief that his thoughts create
reality).
The primary obsessive acts of these neurotics are of an entirely magical character. If they
are not charms, they are at all events counter-charms, designed to ward off the expectations
of disaster with which the neurosis usually starts. Whenever I have succeeded in penetrating
the mystery, I have found that the expected disaster was death. Schopenhauer has said that
the problem of death stands at the outset of every philosophy; and we have already seen ...
that the origin of the belief in souls and in demons, which is the essence of animism, goes
back to the impression which is made upon men by death.
Id. at 86-87.
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has proposed a model of salvation that justifies the exclusion, in the first
instance, involved in the production of identity.
But this, I submit, leaves us with a choice, for the will to fusion is also
the will to love. How, then, do we characterize the erotic limits of the
ethical self? What is the self's desire, and must it always lead to death and
the abjection of alterity? We cannot know ·companionship unless we
understand the radical loneliness at the heart of the discourse as a device
for producing the self's desire. 68 Although, as Paul Kahn suggests, love sits
outside the law, and it is only through the law that we obtain the idea of
love,69 the law itself provides aporia that intimate the reality and
independence of love's existence, as the self's desire. But determining
whether love is always colonized by the abject will to fusion and
immediacy, or something that refuses abjection and incorporates barriers
involves, I suggest, a choice.
Stated at its simplest, it is a choice between love and death. 70 But
nothing is ever quite so simple, for both contain pieces of the other. It is
what we do with those pieces of the other within the self (law) that
determines either a narrative that ends in the violent expulsion and
eradication of the other, or a narrative that resists this end, thereby
overturning the expectations oflaw as stasis. 71
These themes-eroticism and the will to fusion Ontimacy), identity and
exclusion, desire and imperialism-may be captured in the "dispositif
erotique" (erotic device) vividly portrayed in a 2000 film by Chantel
Akerman called La Captive (The Captive). 72 Films on taboo eroticism lend
themselves to an excavation of the deeper erotic or libidinal investment in
displaced violence, because for a disturbing moment they permit a view of
eroticism in crisis, and the eroticism's deep core of violence and violation.
Through the figure of Simon, the protagonist, I hope to clarify the
complicity of the outside observer in the other's eroticized destruction.
68

See, e.g., ROBERT W. FIRESTONE & JOYCE CATLETT, FEAR OF INTIMACY 24 (Am. Psychological Ass'n
1999). "Couples and families are mere abstractions, not real entities. The individuals concerned are
very real and do matter. Similarly, one can only analyze the value of a social system or society by
analyzing its effect on its members: If the individual members are flourishing, it is constructive; if they
are impaired or suffering under the social process, then it is obviously destructive." Id.
69
See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 123
(1999). "Law emerges as a cultural formation bounded by an other created simultaneously with law
itself. A world of law is one in which revolution and love are constantly seen as both the objects of
exclusion and the objects of desire." Id.
70
See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CNILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 55-58 (James Strachey trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1961) (discussing the struggle between love and death). But see FIRESTONE & CATLETT,
supra note 68, at 33. "I reject [Freud's] conceptualization of a death instinct as such, and instead
~erceive aggression as derived from frustration." Id.
1
Schmitt analyzes the distinction between war (the Greek "polemos") and "insurrection, upheaval,
rebellion, civil war" (stasis); but Schwab notes, in the same footnote, that "[s]tasis also means the exact
opposite, i.e., peace and order." See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 28-29 n.9
(George Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press 1976) (analyzing the distinction between war (the Greek
"polemos")).
.
7
Akerman says her film was inspired by Marcel Proust's La Prisonniere, the fifth volume of A la
Recherche du Temps Perdu ("Remembrance of Things Past"). The film is not a rendition of the novel,
but it does carry the eroticism to a logical conclusion, death, rather than simply abandonment. See LA
CAPTIVE, supra note 47.
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As a disciplinary mechanism, the taboo eroticism in the film indexes, at
one level, the way the violence of imperialism is internalized and encoded
with libidinal desire, which in turn presents analogies to the discourse on
genocide. The element of taboo eroticism played out in the genocidal event
is particularly evident in the instance of mass rape as an act of genocide.
These unspeakable acts are of necessity specular events, and their very
existence weighs upon the psychic imagination as the displacement of
violence that structures the dispositif.
The link between rape and eroticism has been suggested by Katherine
Baker, who outlines the many and complex motivations for rape. 73 Baker's
typologies of rape include rape as lovemaking, 74 rape as theft (the
commodification of sex),,; 5 rape as a confused and thwarted "desire for
intimacy,"76 power-rape, anger-rape, 78 and sadistic rape. 79 She writes:
"Some anger rapists reach the point of what Groth calls sadism. In these
situations, '[t]here is a sexual transformation of anger and power so that
aggression itself becomes eroticized.' Often these rapists murder their
victims after, and possibly even before, raping them." 80
Sadistic rapists, Baker notes, are the exception-a mere 6% of reported
rapes-and yet, "[t]hese men are the paradigm, but they are not most
rapists."81 Baker suggests that sadistic rape, the eroticization of violence
and aggression, is the cultural paradigm of rape, and that this belies the
serious harm caused by the many other kinds of rape, rape from a variety of
other motivations, that do not conform to the sadistic rape paradigm. 82
Another typology of rape, rape used to "insult or denigrate other
men,"83 is particularly prevalent in war. The link to eroticism here is latent,
related to the eroticizing of power, competition, and humiliation of the
73

Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 563 ( 1997). "Rape, at least in the words of one survivor, 'is death.' It is 'a primal experience to
which other events might be meaningfully analogized-the 'rape' of the land, the 'rape' of a people.
But rape itself cannot be reduced to other painful experiences." Id. at 605.
74
See id. at 599-600.
75
See id. at 602-03.
76
See id. at 609.
77
See id. at 608-09.
78
See id.
19
See id. at 611.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82
Id. at 611-12.
"Most rape victims are not victims of angry, sadistic rapists. This does not mean that most
rape victims are not raped; it does not mean that rape victims fabricate their stories; and it
does not mean that what happens to them is okay. It does belie the common belief that
rapists are crazy men whose sadistic hunger for sex or hatred of women compels them to
rape."
Id.
83
Id. at 607-08.
Thus, the US soldiers left the 11th Brigade patch in order to impugn the honor of North
Vietnamese men [in the My Lai rapes] .... By making the fact of their rapes public, the
soldiers added further insult to the enemy. This view explains why rapes during wartime
often take place in public or are [sic] committed in front of civilian witnesses, and it explains
why rape and war have gone hand in hand since there has been war. The rapist seeks to
demonstrate the superiority of his team. He does this by raping the property of the enemy.
Id.
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enemy. The enemy, "the other," can be either male or female; it is rare that
the instigator of this eroticized violation of the other is a woman.
There have, however, been cases of women accused of encouraging
and even committing wartime rapes. Consider the harrowing story of
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, as told by Peter Landesman. 84 This is a story of
rape deployed as a weapon of war and of genocide-rape "unto death. " 85
Pauline, as she is generally called, is currently being detained in Arusha,
Tanzania, where she "faces 11 charges, including genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes."86 Landesman notes that "[s]he is the first
woman ever to be charged with these crimes in an international court. And
she is the first woman ever to be charged with rape as a crime against
humanity."87 Pauline is accused of goading the militias to rape the women
before killing them. 88 The soldiers, according to a witness, "said that
Pauline had given them permission to go after the Tutsi girls, who were too
proud of themselves.... She was the minister [for women's affairs in the
Habyarimana administration], so they said they were free to do it."89
"Pauline had led the soldiers to see the rape as a reward." 90 Often, the
descriptions of her crimes are brutal; for instance, this from Rose, a
witness, to Landesman, "Hutu soldiers took m.x mother outside ... stripped
off her clothes and raped her with a machete." 1
Why rape? As Sydia Nduna, an advisor at the International Rescue
Committee Rwanda tells Landesman:
'Did you ever see the look in a woman's eyes when she sees a child of
rape? ... It's a depth of sadness you cannot imagine.' The impact of the
mass rapes in Rwanda, she said, will be felt for generations. 'Mass rape
forces the victims to live with the consequences, the damage, the
children,' Nduna explained.92

Landesman continues, "Making matters worse, the rapes, most of them
committed by many men in succession, were frequently accompanied by
other forms of physical torture and often staged as public performances to
multiply the terror and degradation. So many women feared them that they
84

Peter Landesman, A Womans Work, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Sept. 15, 2002 at 82.
Id.
86 Id.
87
Id. at 86.
In most cases, she is accused of inciting crimes rather than carrying them out herself.
However, according to a document prepared by tribunal investigators in preparation for the
trial, one witness, code-named Q.C., saw a Tutsi community leader die 'at the hands of
Nyiramasuhuko.' (The report does not specify what weapon Pauline used) .... Pauline has
consistently denied the charges against her.
Id. at 86. Another woman, Biljana Plavsic, former President of the Republika Srpska, was also charged
with genocide and crimes against humanity, for her part in the Bosnian atrocities. In October 2002 she
pied guilty to one count of persecution, and was sentenced to 11 years. See, e.g., International Criminal
Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Case, Case Information Sheets, at http://www.un.org/icty/
~lance/plavsic.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
Id. at 83.
89
Id. at 84.
90 Id.
91
Id. at 89.
92 Id.
85
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often begged to be killed instead."93 The theme of rape being worse than
death is picked up later on, when Landesman speaks to the prisoners in the
Rwandan detention centers, accused of rape and murder. 94 This is one of
those interviews:
Lucien told me in detail about killing [a woman about whom he now had
recurring nightmares]. But when I asked Lucien if he'd raped the woman,
he fell silent and fought back tears. Every prisoner I spoke with described
explicitly whom he killed and how. Not a single one admitted to raping a
Tutsi woman. 95

Landesman speculates that this silence may be for two reasons: one, the
government had listed "rape committed during the genocide" as "the
highest category of crime; those convicted were sentenced to death." 96 The
second reason, he speculates, may have been because "These men could
somehow justify to themselves having murdered but not raped. In any
event, the weight of that level of confession was obviously too much to
bear, and if there could be any tan9ible proof that rape was considered the
more shameful crime, it was this." 9
Rape is viewed as the most shameful part of the genocidal experience,
according to Robert Jay Lifton, because it destro~s the woman, "the symbol
of purity" which is at the center of the family. 9 Lifton reiterates that "in
this way, rape is worse than death. " 99 The more powerful the claim of the
thing to be destroyed, the more virulent the destruction, and the more
shameful the feeling in its wake. Luchino Visconti's films, especially The
Damned, 100 capture this sense of the erotic deployed to destroy the other
(or, more precisely, the self's alterity). Martin von Essenbeck, the
ambitious son in The Damned capitulates to his bitterness and destroys his
mother Sophie by raping her. 101 By doing so, he finally achieves the sense
of invincibility, which in the film is symbolized by donning the uniform of

93

Id.

Often the rapes were in fact a prelude to murder. But sometimes the victim was not killed
but instead repeatedly violat~d and then left alive; the humiliation would then affect not only
the victim but also those closest to her. Other times, women were used as a different kind of
tool: half-dead, or even already a corpse, a woman would be publicly raped as a way for
Interahamwe mobs to bond together.
Id.
See id. at 125.
95 Id.

94

96

Id.

Id.
9& Id.
99
Id. On the subject of shame, quoting Robert Jay Lifton:
'Rape sets in motion continuous suffering and extreme humiliation that affects not just the
individual victim but everyone around her,' said ... Lifton, who[ se books have] explored the
psychology of genocide. 'A woman is seen as a symbol of purity. The family revolves
around that symbol. Then here is the brutal attack on that, stigmatizing them all. All this
perpetuates the humiliation, reverberating among survivors and their whole families .... In
this way, rape is worse than death.'

91

Id.
100
101

THE DAMNED (Warner Brothers 1969).
Id.
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a Nazi officer. But it is a symbol also of his peculiar catastrophe. 102 The
sex act in the film is depicted with immense tenderness, like the still waters
of an unfathomably deep hatred. Meanwhile, his mother slips into
madness, catalepsy, and eventual (enforced) suicide.
When the Hutu militias raped the Tutsi women "out of existence,"
fueled as they were by envy and enmity toward the Tutsis, 103 they were
"engaged not only in an act of sexual transgression but also a purifying
ritual. ... 'The propaganda made Tutsi women powerful, desirable-and
therefore something to be destroyed,' Rhonda Copelan [said]." 104 But what
drove Pauline to incite rape? Landesman discovers that Pauline and her
family are in fact Tutsis, at least in part. 105 Her sister, Vineranda,
speculated that when things changed in Rwanda in 1959 and it became
dangerous to be a Tutsi, "Pauline was afraid that maybe the government
would find out. And she was among many men in the government. And
she had money and a position. She didn't want to lose that." 106 Lifton
suggests another reason, "'Part of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko's fierceness had
to do with eliminating the Tutsi in her,' he hypothesized. 'She was
undergoin¥ an individual struggle to destroy that defiled element in
herself." 10
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Sophie von Essenbeck (of The Damned),
despite their different fates, were similar with respect to their sons. As
Landesman notes, "Pauline did possess humanity, but it was in short
supply, and she reserved it for her only son, Shalom, whom she had helped
tum into a rapist and a killer." 108 The son in each case had been created to
destroy the object of self-hatred within and to purify the subject. 109
The themes of purity and shame are particularly key to the
nonconsensual act of sadistic or denigrative rape. But they are also key to
the consensual sadomasochistic sexual relationship in Akerman's depiction
of taboo eroticism, where sex is encoded with the death instinct or will.
Sadistic rape, "rape unto death," and consensual eroticized aggression,
however, all take place within a cultural context. Baker notes that
what leads many rapists to rape is not a perverse or abnormal sexual need,
but a common, if distressing, failure to understand or appreciate the
gravity of the harm that they inflict when they obtain sex by force. This

102
Shame and catastrophe are closely linked. Here, the film seems to suggest that the son suffers a
catastrophe, of which his mother's rape is at least in part the denouement, when he discovers that the six
rcear-old girl whom he ravaged and drove to suicide was in fact a Jew. See id.
03
Landesman, supra note 84, at 130. "Unlike the Nazis, who were fueled by myths of Aryan
superiority, the Hutus were driven by an accumulated rage over their lower status and by resentment of
suoposed Tutsi beauty and arrogance." Id.

104"/d.
See id.
106 Id.
101
Id. at 132.
108
Id. at 134.
105

109
The mother, after the rape, runs her hands over a lock of her own blond hair preserved amongst her
son's childhood possessions. She also finds crude childish paintings representing her son murdering his
mother with the words, "Mother destroy." See THE DAMNED, supra note I 00.
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failure is linked to the cultural acceptance of sexualized violence,
instrumental aggression, and a commodified view of sexuality. 110

This is equally true of consensual violent or sadomasochistic sex (taboo
eroticism).
Akerman's film, La Captive, is not explicitly sadomasochistic, but
suggests the mapping of sex over the attempt to control the core of erotic
violence (violence "unto death"). 111 In analyzing the film, I want to
highlight the norms that translate this attempt to control the death wish
through a displacement of violation onto the other, i.e., the deeper
substratum of the juridical discourse (libidinal investment in the
borderline).
La Captive begins with Simon, blandly handsome and somewhat
delicate, watching a film of a group of young women cavorting on a beach
in Normandy. 112 The film is silent. Eventually it settles upon the face of
Ariane, whom we later discover is Simon's lover. Ariane and her friend
Arldree are seen sitting next to each other and Ariane 's mouth moves as she
stares blankly at the camera. Simon plays the scene over and over,
evidently attempting to decipher the words. "I ... think ... I think ... I ..
. really ... I really ... like ... I really like you." 113 He seems either to be
projecting her words or his own, but in any event he speaks for a silent (and
silenced) Ariane.
Simon lives in a strangely Kafka-esque apartment, lots of small rooms
and tight, winding corridors, in a posh part of Paris. He drives expensive
cars and is often chauffeur-driven in a Rolls-Royce. He lives with his
grandmother, Ariane, and a housemaid. Ariane has her own room,
apparently because she "brings in" pollen, to which Simon is allergic. But
the provision of separate chambers for the two lovers is only one way in
which the film emphasizes symmetries that call attention to their
relationship as a particular kind of "dispositif erotique" (erotic device), as
Akerman calls it. 114 The inner, claustrophobic spaces are juxtaposed
against the open spaces in a seemingly empty Paris, as well as the open
country scenes. Within those void-like spaces, the minimalist, antinaturalistic acting style stands out in sharp relief, the inscrutability taking
on the substance of a solid object. 115 The void-like spaces also emphasize
the inner chambers, in which the mother-son relationship is played out by
allusion to the Simon-Ariane affair. 116
In both inner and outer spaces, we follow Simon as he becomes
increasingly obsessed with managing every aspect of Ariane's life,
110

Baker, supra note 73, at 612.
See LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47.
112
See id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (Akerrnan's interview about the film is recorded on the 2001 DVD release.)
115
Cf Budnitz, supra note 52, at 87 (inscrutability analogous to the baby's blackness as
color/complexion, rather than the absence of color).
116
Akerman affirms the mother-son dimension in relation to the interiors in this and other of her films,
within the interview: the apartments "are both protective and suffocating .... We don't need to search
far [for why this is so]: it's the mother relationship." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47.
111
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including the thoughts and dreams to which he has no access. Ariane
continually escapes, and is undisturbed by his scrutiny, his following her
about, even his violent dragging of her from a soiree with her friends on
one occasion. In a style reminiscent of the French nouveau-roman, their
words are spare and repetitive. She says things like, "What I want is what
you want"; he says, "As you know I am without memory," but later insists,
during their breakup (dialogue taken more directly from Proust), that she
confess more of her lies: "But what are two lies? Give me at least four.
Then maybe I'll believe you. Without blame. At least I'll have memories,
real ones. " 117 But Ariane has no more to tell: "No, nothing. Nothing else."
"Nothing else?" "Nothing." 118
When Simon insists she tell him more lies "for my dignity" and
suggests that she had never loved him the way she had loved and continues
to miss her life as a lesbian (there are suggestions she continues to enjoy
lesbian affairs even under Simon's watch, further inflaming his obsessions),
Ariane has one of her longest monologues in the film:
Ariane: You talk of things you don't know.
Simon: No, alas. We're like strangers at times.
Ariane: At times, yes. But that's what I like. You want to know all, as if
that changed something. Me, I ask you nothing. Neither what you think,
nor dream. And if you told me all, I feel I'd love you less. I love you
because there's a part of you I don't know. I imagine you've this world I
cannot enter. That it's closed to me only pleases me.
Simon: See? We cannot get alon~. I'm the total opposite (le contraire).
For me, love is the very opposite. 11

The oft-repeated words-"au contraire," "si tu veux," "rien"-suggest
that the erotic device works precisely because they want different things
which are both, paradoxically, satisfied by the device: her elusiveness feeds
his obsession, and his surveillance allows her to live in the moments of
escape. The rigid formality of the device provides the necessary constraint
for her erotic imagination and, ultimately, unattainability.
The
consummation of their affair, within the cramped ~parters of Simon's or
Ariane's chambers, is also represented as onanistic, 1 0 with a fully-clothed
Simon rubbing himself against a sleeping Ariane (she may be feigning
sleep) until he ejaculates (Ariane, meanwhile, cries "Andree!" after one
such incident). Likewise, the bathroom scene, where each bathes on
opposite sides of an opaque glass partition, suggests the impenetrability of
their erotic lives, even as their conversation consists of Ariane worrying
about how much she smells, and Simon giving detailed instructions as to
her toilette ("Wash your vagina carefully, but keep it moist," and so on). 121
111

Id.

11s Id.
119
120

Id.

121

Id.

In the Akerman interview, the interviewer notes, in relation to the love scenes, "We can't say that
Simon has failed." Id.
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The eroticism of the lovers is encoded (code, coda) with death,
suggested by the score itself (Rachmaninoff's "Isle of the Dead"). Fusion
takes place between self and other only as shadows, crossing and mergin~
across the walls of isolated buildings or on the grass of an empty park. 1
Simon literally has an allergic reaction to Ariane, a ''jlorilege vide," the
pollen of her efflorescence symbolizing her ripeness unto death, her careful
(and separate) toilette and ultimate effluence (she is drowned, or drowns
herself, it is unclear) representing the purification rites that are achieved in
the end. Death has been signified at the beginning, through Simon's
imposition of a script onto Ariane's silence, and is suggested by the opacity
of the bathroom screen (death of the gaze, inscrutability).
The encoding of death as the rigid law of the erotic is also signaled by
the peculiar position of the spectator. We are complicit from the beginning,
as we watch Simon stalk his desire through the empty streets of Paris,
reminiscent of Hitchcock's Vertigo. The cultivated blandness of Simon's
face, the subtle vulnerability of his body always clad in gray, his duck-like
gait, make him an easy receptacle for our own projections. He is a ready
conduit for our surveillance of Ariane, awakening a curiosity and an illicit
desire for penetration and exposure, for "real" memories (what really
happens between Ariane and the opera singer? Between Ariane and
Andree, with their secret smiles and giggles?).
Simon's fragility suggests the stereotypical mama's boy, engendering a
desire to protect him in the wild, abstract, open spaces, where death
threatens (Simon asks Ariane to kiss him as she drives and she obliges; the
car lurches onto an embankment, opposite a cliff). Simon's loneliness and
fixation on the sex lives of women suggests a libidinal cathexis that borders
on homo- or auto-eroticism, recalling the allusive and suppressed
homosexuality of Marcel's relationship to Albertine in Proust's
Remembrance. A cold, wet, trembling and solitary 123 Simon at the end
recalls the self-mastery of Pauline's son Shalom (as rapist and killer), or the
debauched son Martin in The Damned, where the protagonist kills that
which is himself, that which he loves (erotic obsession). 124 Simon, bobbing
closer toward us across the waves as the score swells louder, is finally the
master of this dark universe, dominating the alienated landscape, the grey,
chopping waves and the bleak promontory in the distance. But the cost of
122
This seems to be a popular device in films of the erotic. In L'annee derniere a Marienbad, the
protagonists compare themselves to shadows; for instance, the woman, A, says to the man, X, that "You
are like a shadow closing in on me .... " (" Vous etes comme une ombre et vous attendez que me proche
... Oh laissez-moi, laissez-moi, laissez-moi.") L'ANNEE DERNIERE A MARIENBAD (Alain Resnais
1961).
123
Simon is in a boat with a boatman; a blanket on the floor of the boat may be covering Ariane's body.
See id.
124
For a related examination of the eroticization of violence whereby the protagonist gains mastery over
the other by subverting the male-female power relations, see e.g., Liliana Cavanni's The Night Porter.
The female victim (Lucia) of sadomasochistic rape and abuse by a Nazi officer (Max) in a concentration
camp during the war meets her abuser twelve years later in a hotel in Vienna, where she has come to
stay with her famous pianist husband. Since the war, Max is already a reduced man, a porter at the
hotel. The two enter and replay their sexual relationship, but this time Lucia, as the masochist, has the
power, and she uses it to destroy Max, ultimately destroying herself in the process. THE NIGHT PORTER
(Iotar Film 1973).
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mastery is that Simon has had to rewrite the earlier scene at the beach. The
frolicking women become a disjointed memory recalled through the lens of
a destroyed but transcendent Simon, shivering in the dawn wind and
scarred by Ariane's absence. 125
Negative space, then, becomes the central trope in this eroticization of
death. Here I want to pick up the themes suggested in the film and relate
them to the analysis of the discourse on genocide. Negative space is also a
central theme in the discourse on genocide as the constitutive element of
the subject's relation to the other: the other is petrified within the void,
quarantined within the opaque interior spaces, and abjected into the
turbulent sea, far from the center, far from conscious will. Where Pauline's
fixation on rape as the means toward this abjection is more allusive, the
film represents the abject more explicitly, if elliptically, within the
structuring of space, time, consciousness, and memory.
Thinking of the relationship between the erotic and death as a carefully
structured dispositif, one sees an order or a "law" in operation, and it is the
law as crisis, exception (corruption) as norm. It is the antithesis of
romance, 126 love without memory, an investment in the decomposition 127 of
love. Love is envisaged, precisely because of this investment, as perfect
merger, as ritual purification (shadows are pure, abstract, empty), and as an
overcoming of the self (shadows are darkness, other, the not-self, the
aporetic insistence). Simon's being, as with the spectator's in relation to
the object (and production) of desire, is "a rupture opening to let out the
'excess' of an unmaintainable and thus delusive unity, whether that unity is
consciousness, the body, a community, or even a nation." 128
Eroticized death, or the decomposition of love, is the substratum of the
juridical translation of the event or crisis. 129 The denial (or effluence) of
125

See, e.g., GILLES DELEUZE, CINEMA 2: THE nME-[MAGE at 196 (Hugh Tomlinson & Robert Galeta
trans., Athlone 1989). In reference to another of Akerman 's films, Jeanne Dielmann says
In the same place or in space, a woman's body achieves a strange nomadism which makes it
cross ages, situations and places (this was Virginia Woolf's secret in literature). The states of
the body secrete the slow ceremony which joins together the corresponding attitudes, and
develop a female gest which overcomes the history of men and the crisis of the world. It is
this gest which reacts on the body giving it a hieratism like an austere theatricalization, or
rather a 'stylization.'
Id.
126
In his interview, Akerman states, "[La Captive is t]he opposite of a romantic film. Even if there's
romantic music." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 4 7.
127
I borrow the term from Deleuze's Cinema 2: Time-Image, in reference to
a process of decomposition which eats away at them [i.e., Visconti 's aristocrats] from within,
and makes them dark and opaque: the rotting of Ludwig II's teeth, family rot which takes
over the teacher in Conversation Piece, the debasement of Ludwig Il's love-affairs; and
incest everywhere as in the Bavarian family, the return of Sandro, the abomination of The
Damned; everywhere the thirst for murder and suicide, or the need for forgetting and death,
as the old prince [in The Leopard] says on behalf of the whole of Sicily. It is not just that
these aristocrats are on the brink of being ruined; the approaching ruin is only a
consequence.
DELEUZE, supra note 125, at 94-95.
128
GEORGES BATAILLE, VISIONS OF EXCESS: SELECTED WRITINGS, I 927-1939 xxi (Allan Stocki trans.,
Univ. of Minn. 1985.)
129
This relation is Freudian and depends upon the central absence and transcendence of the phallus as
law. A critique of this Freudian analysis notes:
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alterity-the projection of violence-is no more than the conception of
love and care of the other that comes to us through the distorting lens of
exclusion. Exclusion, as I hope to show in the following, is the gesture of
the law (exception) that constrains the category of the ethical. As such, this
problematic of an eroticism-death complex is historically contingent: the
more the self or sovereign is im-mediated, the more alterity is eroticized
and abjected (law of exception). The discourse on genocidal violence
represents a code, or a mode of surveillance or disciplinary mechanism
(dispositif), tying us rigorously to the immanent specular, requiring the
evisceration of a failed will to fusion with the other.
Confinement, decomposition, sacral purification, 130 the fatality of
fusion: these are the themes that map both the eroticism of death (alterity)
and genocide as a juridical discourse (the ethical self). In both, the
investment in death suggests the tension between justice-each party
obtains what he or she wants; the device, as with the juridical, is a
success 131 -and truth: disclosure, memory, counter-memory (amnesia 132 ).
As Bataille notes, "Eroticism opens the way to death. Death opens the way
to the denial of our individual lives. Without doing violence to our inner
selves, are we able to bear a negation that carries us to the farthest bounds
of possibility?" 133 The erotic, in short, is always a tension between love
and violation.
Genocide, the annihilation of the other, occurs at a distance. But
excavating the eroticism suppressed within the discourse on genocide may
reveal genocide as also the narrative of displaced violence. The narrative
is ruled and managed by the ethical act; this is apposite to the event itself as
engendered in part and permitted by the erotic investment itself. The
subterranean darkness, the subconscious terrain that orders and cabins our
desire for confinement within the code, the will to an impossible fusion, the
ensuing disgust and exclusion: all this suggests something more subtle,
more elusive, than simply the increasingly depressed and cauterized ethical
The [sexual] triangle takes form in the parental use [mommy-daddy-me], and reproduces
itself in the conjugal use. We do not yet know what forces bring about this triangulation that
interferes with the recording of desire in order to transform all its productive connections.
But we are able at least to follow, abstractly, the manner in which these forces proceed.... It
is clear that such a totality-unity is posited only in terms of a certain mode of absence, as that
which partial objects and subjects of desire 'lack' .... This common, transcendent, absent
something will be called phallus or Jaw, in order to designate 'the' signifier that distributes
the effects of meaning throughout the chain and introduces exclusions there (whence the
oedipalizing [sic] interpretations ofLacanism).
GILLES DELEUZE & FELD( GUATIARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM & SCHIZOPHRENIA 72-73 (Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem & Helen R. Lane trans., Viking Press 1977).
130
"[A]ll eroticism has a sacramental quality." BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 15-16.
131
Akerman contends, in the interview, that the erotic device "suits them," recalling a similar
mechanism in Stanley Kubrick's Eyes Wide Shut: "In that macabre, theatrical scene, these powerful
reople" develop a device "that suits their eroticism." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47.
32
With regard to the films of Orson Welles, "Welles's nihilism finds a way of being expressed which is
inherited from Nietzshe: suppress your recollections, or suppress yourselves." DELEUZE, supra note
125,atll3.
133
See BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 24. After quoting from Rimbaud, Bataille adds: "Poetry leads to the
same place as all forms of eroticism-to the blending and fusion of separate objects. It leads us to
eternity, it leads us to death, and through death to continuity. Poetry is eternity; the sum matched with
the sea." Id. at 25.
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sense as more and more images from "out there" drag us into the vortex of
a "pornography" 134 of specular violence and humiliation. There is, I
suggest, something more willed, something intimating actual governance
and conflict management, inflorescent and suppressed, that is evident in the
pervasive production of images and stories of the ravaged and chaotic
other. In short, there is something of the willed if subconscious production
of otherness as chaotic and violent.
In the following analysis of the discourse on genocide as a function of
borders, I hope to show that the spectator, the "we," is a discursive identity,
along with the actual victim and perpetrator of genocidal violence. I do not
mean to suggest a moral equivalence between the three identities by
arguing that the discursive borders are constitutive of their particular
identities. That is, I do not suggest that there are not "real" victims,
perpetrators and observers of genocidal violence, but rather that their
identities within the discourse as such are a function of the discourse. Each
party enters the discourse and incorporates the identity (assignation) by
choice, by a prescriptive love that is a shadow of community. I believe it is
here, at the borders constructed as a function of identity, that the imperialist
script makes its claims upon us, upon our desires. Thus, it is not so much
the fact of cabining desire that is problematic with respect to the interface
of death, self, and other, so much as the way desire is calibrated and
perceived to engender the will to purity and disaggregation.
III.
A.

BORDERS

THE WILL TO MORAL PURITY

The terror of recognizing this intimate enemy constitutes another threat to
our sense of security and self-assurance.
-Robert Firestone 135
In this part on eroticism and borders, I begin with the normative border
as the stable wall that divides the self from the other as an operation, within
the crisis (exception) of the wall that divides the self from its alterity. I will
analyze two alternatives to the norm of stability: one suggests the
nonexclusionary border, a porosity that permits a view of the self's
otherness within the moment of love and community. This view, taken
from theology, posits a libidinal investment in the eroticism of the "death"
of the self, thus obviating abjection (or the displacement of violence and
chaos onto the other). The second view, taken from secular liberalism and
it postmodern critique, posits borders as "borderlessness" or hybridity.
134
See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, The Terrorist as Auteur, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, available at
www.nytimes.com/2004/1 l/14/14TERROR.htrnl (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (discussing the
proliferation of executions and bombings by terrorists, noting that "( t]his is terrorism as pornography,
and it acts like pornography: at first making audiences feel curious and aroused, despite themselves,
then ashamed, possibly degraded and finally, perhaps, just indifferent."). Ignatieff's call is to a return to
our "repugnance" in order not to descend, in the "vortex," to become like the terrorists, i.e., "by
becoming as barbarous as he is." See id.
135
FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 34.
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This too translates the eroticism of death as the embrace of immanence or
immortality. 136 Both are concerned with a "return to the self' and its return
to the political as a reconfiguration of the border as law, and both begin
with a perception of law, under the stable border of the modern sovereign, '
as the "exception" or crisis necessary for the meaning of sovereignty within
the international legal system (how global conflicts are managed). The
"neutral space" within which reconfiguration is permitted (between self and
other) may have its weaknesses, but at least posits the possibility of choice
and thus the non-inevitability of the death-erotic complex of the discourse
on genocide.
There is a difference between eradicating borders altogether and
reconfiguring the borders that divide. The fantasy of fusion offers a vision
of human community as mad. Abjection and the fear of fusion, in tum, are
an index of the surveillance and control of the borders used to countermand
the excess of the other, translated within the juridical as the proper
maintenance of the self against the terror of violence. The borders define
the violence as external and foreign to the self.
The project, then, is to reconsider borders: of innocence, of safety, of
fear. Gaps are opened up only insofar as it is necessary to evacuate the
other, rather than to permit the other to reside within the self. Recall, for
instance, Ariane's plaint to Simon, "If you told me all I feel I'd love you
less"-compared with his to her: "For me, love is the very opposite." 137
Surveillance-by first suppressing the erotic-death complex-is permitted
and enforced by the central vacuity (de-centeredness) of the subject. The
borders are necessary to maintain control. Borders have thus been
endowed with the incidents of power: along the parapets of the wall, the
sovereign polices its territory and protects itself from incursion. Within the
discourses of imperialism and genocide, borders are the site of rule and
command.
In this section, I propose to reconsider borders with two premises in
mind. First, borders themselves are not the problem to be eliminated since,
given the imperialist script, their eradication merely ratifies a dream of
fusion that is itself problematic. The dream, of course, is powerful and
persuasive. Second, borders, as the site of rule and command, are also the
site of desire with respect to both capital and libidinal investments. For
Deleuze and Guattari the border, in the figure of the Oedipal, controls "the
economy of flows. The flows and productions of desire will simply be
viewed as the unconscious of the social productions. Behind every
investment of time and interest and capital, an investment of desire, and
vice versa." 138 This again argues against the eradication of borders. As
Miroslav Vcilf notes (in the religious context), "A demarcation line exists,

136

"We are afraid to discover not that we are mortal but, rather, that we are immortal." See Z!i.EK,
sur,ra note 17, at 69.
13
LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47.
138
Mark Seem, Introduction to ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA, at xv, xviii.
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but the focus is not on 'maintaining the boundary' but 'on reaffirming the
center. "' 139
B.

EROTIC MOMENTS

The return to oneself leads the individual to question his truth ....
-Julia Kristeva 140
Kigali, Rwanda: fall, 1995. I am a member of the United Nations
Human Rights Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR). There are fourteen of us,
all lawyers, from different parts of the world: United States, Canada,
United Kingdom, Spain, France, Sweden, Austria, Peru, Ecuador, Greece,
and Ghana (that would be me). It is mid-September and we have been here
for about a month. My duties in Kigali include centralizing the reports
from the field teams, which involves frequent trips to the prefectures. I'm
responsible for three such teams, all in the north. One day, I accompany
the team responsible for Kibungo prefecture to the west of Kigali. We visit
the Ntarama Church, the site of one of the worst massacres in 1994. It is a
year later, but the church has been cordoned off and the bodies still lie
rotting on the grounds and within the church itself. The local gendarmes
let us onto the grounds; a desk has been set up near the church entrance,
upon which have been piled bones and skulls collected from the grounds
and the outlying area. We are accompanied by Jacques, 141 a senior U.N.
officer assigned to Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide;
he's been with the mission, in other words, for about a year. He took a
leave of absence from his job as lecturer at a university in Quebec.
I have come out of the church and feel nauseous, dizzy. People are
taking pictures of the bodies, of the small collection of curious children
standing on a knoll. I lean against the church wall, too undone even to swat
the flies away. In front of me is a tall, very handsome Rwandan gendarme.
He picks up a skull from the table nearby and shakes it; a two-inch long
nail rattles about inside the skull. The gendarme looks at me, his eyes
seeming for an instant to blaze. But as I look, his face becomes a mask.
He puts the skull down. Jacques is next to him, takes his arm, and leads
him away, speaking softly. I've heard that they are lovers. Love, suddenly,
amongst all this; I feel amazed, and envious, and then ashamed.
It is now mid-November. The mission has been exhausting, relentless,
intensely rigorous, depressing. Our sense of connection to the outside
world seems tenuous: the O.J. Simpson trial, the Canadian referendum on
self-determination, all coming to us like a pantomime through a veil,
vaguely irrelevant and yet crucially important, the link to other lives. Our
sense of connection to the people here seems equally tenuous: their grief is
139
VOLF, supra note 20, at 71. The statement is made with respect to the recentering of the decentered
self by the "crucifixion," and as such may be controversial, to say the least, within the secular context.
It does offer an alternative to the eradication of borders which seems, at face. value, to be the solution
proposed by postrnodemists, as I suggest in the following. See also Tawia Ansah, Surprised by Sin:
Human Rights and Universality, 30 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COM. 307 (2003) (discussing the
decentered self).
140
Kristeva, supra note 51, at I 0 I.
141
All names changed to preserve privacy.
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unfathomable, the intense competition between returning Tutsi refugees
and local Tutsi survivors seems all-consuming, and yet a deflection from
other, deeper issues; the hot tension between Hutus and Tutsis, the
presumptively guilty and the innocent, still percolates, often erupting in
violence. And then there is the welter of languages, of missions,
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, local and foreign,
all with different mandates and agendas, all throwing money and ideas and
demands and information at the hapless Rwandans.
The sense of connection is further attenuated by the sheer scope of the
problems: so many rape victims, so many orphaned children, so many
scarred and embattled bodies and psyches, and so much mask-like stoicism
and silence. We bond amongst ourselves, but this too becomes incestuous.
Jealousies and national rivalries flare up as the Canadians vie against the
Americans, the Europeans against both and amongst each other, the South
Americans and Asians forming and breaking alliances, the whites and
blacks beginning to speak of the "privileges" of the other, and so on.
Connectedness is in short supply.
I accompany one of my teams on a field trip in the northern prefecture
of Ruhengheri. I'm delighted to get out of the capital and spend some time
with my good friend Perikles. We visit a detention center deep in the
forests, having received reports of prisoner abuse. The trip is largely pro
forma: the team interviews various local officials as the villagers gather
around and look on, curiously. The soldiers patrol the vicinity. The
detention center itself, known as a "cach6t," is a small square building with
a bare floor and a motley collection of detainees, many apprehended with
nothing more than a pointed finger and the word, "lnterahamwe!" 142
Because they are Hutu, nothing more need be said; this is, after all, only a
year after the genocide. But it is part of our job to see that they receive due
process, hence the interviews and the record checks.
I wait outside the cachot for my colleague Catha to conclude her
interviews so we can head out to the next village before sunset. A
gendarme leaves the office building nearby, and the soldiers around the
cach6t seem to straighten up. The gendarme comes toward me, his
Kalashnikov slung over a shoulder. I'm struck by his beauty, but this is not
unusual in Rwanda. He takes my hand, says he's the new commander-inchief of the gendarmes, is pleased to meet me, and asks me my name. And
then something happens, something strange. We connect. In my mind I
see Jacques and his lover; I think of other stories of international workers
having liaisons with the locals. He holds my hand; his name is Pascal.
Time stops as we stand just so, staring at each other. I fancy myself in
love. And then he talks, in French: "Here in Rwanda, we are still suffering
not only the effects of the genocide, but the genocide goes on," he says.
"The woods around here are full of interahamwe. I have authority to shoot
them on sight if they are suspects and resist arrest." I remember
142

The Kinyarwandan word means "those who struggle together" and was used by the civilian militias
who began the slaughtering in April 1994, aided and trained by government armed forces. See, e.g.,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/interahamwe.htm.
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remonstrating, something gentle, effete. He justifies himself. His words
are alienating, but his hand and his eyes are soft, caressing. "Just the other
day-surely you understand, given our situation-I had to give the order to
shoot two of them, running through the forest like wild beasts. We have no
light here, no generator. I gave the order to shoot them in the dark. What
could I do?" We had been walking slowly toward the jeep parked in the
front yard, still holding hands. Pascal is intelligent, articulate. I feel as if
I'm sinking. Pascal says he hopes to see me again. I collect a sense of his
confiding tone, as if I were privy to secrets, as if I alone can understand
him, as if he knows this. I clamber into the jeep, and off we go.
My colleagues ask me what we discussed and I give them the
substance. They reply with scorn, with words such as "absence of any rule
of law," "revenge-killings," and so on. I only half listen, feeling an acute
sense of loss ....
Boston, U.S.A.: summer, 2004. I reflect upon the above incidents,
which took place almost ten years ago. And yet, there it is, this memory
cropping up in a discussion of genocide discourses. Why here, and why
now? My analysis of genocide and its discourses has touched upon the
eroticization of death within two contexts: first, the eroticism as a specific
and encoded sexual encounter between two consenting parties, and second,
the discourse on genocide as erotic dispositif in terms of the construction of
the parties, self and other in specific, coded ways. The incidents described
above, the "memoir" moment of this text, belong neither to the dispositif
nor to the discourse on genocide, properly speaking.
And yet, they suggest an erotic dimension to the lived experience of the
human rights encounter, or the context within which the discourse on
genocide, specifically the law, is deployed and operationalized. The stories
represent a sort of private space that interrupts the public sphere within
which my role and Pascal's are dictated by the mission. Nevertheless, the
moment with Pascal, whether described as lust, or love's potential, or
simply human contact, and whether borne of physical attraction regardless
of the context, or attraction because of the context-the starvation for a
connection, the longing to bridge the narrative gaps between us, the
kinkiness of fancying a man in uniform, the juxtaposition of tenderness
with the violence of his words, his role-is a kind of refusal, transgressive,
however muted.
But even had the attraction been consummated in sex, it would, in
material terms, simply have been an erotic encounter between consenting
parties, notwithstanding the surrounding context: death, violence,
disaggregated narratives. Neither would it have any real effect on the
discourse of genocide as such; the mission would still go on, reports would
still be written, international legal standards would still apply and be
shaped by their application and implementation in Rwanda. (For instance,
there would be others in the chain of authority beyond me and Pascal who
would contest Pascal's story of an "ongoing genocide" as justification for
the denial of due process to suspected interahamwe, because the legal
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definition of genocide had already been determined to apply to events in
Rwanda that did not extend beyond July 1994).
So I tell these stories not to suggest something new about the eroticdeath complex, nor something further about the discourse on genocide, but
rather to suggest the limits of those narrative mechanisms, those codes or
barriers which function as rule and command. Perhaps someone less
desperate for connection, less psychologically or sexually pliable (I
concede noting, naturally), would not have been affected by Jacques or
Pascal, and would be none the worse for it; he would have continued in
role. And to be sure, my emotions as I watched Jacques and his lover, as
well as my conduct with Pascal, were merely the playing out of alternative
roles, not the revelation of some core, stable essence of my self. Each
moment called for a different mapping of borders and centers, none of
which would have made a difference to the discourse on genocide.
But that is precisely the point in these stories: as memoir, they interfere
with the narrative flow even of this text, its generalities regarding the erotic
encounter when played out in a field of pain and death (to use Robert
Cover's phrase regarding the law), or when seen from the vantage point of
the borders of innocence. Memoir asks you to reconfigure the self and
other, to recenter the self in its relation to the other by incorporating the
other. Fusion, borderlessness (deterritoriality), ego-lessness, are at one
extreme of this reconfiguration. Whereas the code (eroticized death) ends
in fusion or its violent renunciation and abjection, the discourse normalizes
the mantle of self-virtue and the expulsion of violence to the "out there" in
order to achieve, once again, disaggregated self and other. In other words,
both device and discourse contain an inherent longing for connection;
whether in the first as the dream of fusion or, in the second, in the attempt
to collect, incorporate and aggregate the plethora of voices, instruments,
and players regarding the operation of the law within the context of
genocide. It is an attempt that left a thirst for contact and connectedness,
for continuity between nationalities, languages, races, and other barriers.
The law, in short, was one-size-fits-all, and we strove to fulfill this promise
(in part by a suppression of the erotic).
The incidents at Ntarama and in Ruhengheri held out the possibility of
transcending the barriers. Just because the erotic moments or intimations
occurred within the context of death does not mean they are ipso facto
examples of the erotic device. On the contrary, these moments-and the
memoir style within the context of an analytical piece-suggest the
discontinuity that is requisite to critiquing the discourse (and, by analogy,
the device).
But discontinuity per se is not the solution being proposed here. As
noted, a critique of the juridical discourse will allow us to take account of
our investment in the violence of the other, the violence "out there." In
order to achieve that object, one must reconfigure the borders that create a
sense of the innocence and guilt of self and other respectively. As such,
merely substituting "discontinuity" as the law's dream instead of
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continuity/fusion, is to propose a dream that the law already
accommodates: witness the disaggregation of the narratives that on their
own lead to a sense of alienation, even as the law as a discourse is being
operationalized, implemented on the ground.
The law allows for
uncertainty and ambiguity, for the eruption of the erotic moment, the secret
sexual liaison. Loneliness and a feeling of despair in the face of the
enormity of genocide by itself does not "critique" the discourse, on the
contrary, it only means, at least in part, that there will be the assurance of a
turnover in the workforce.
The promise of fusion, or the promise of narrative aggregation-the
law's desire for unity and uniformity-is not itself the initial focus of
attention, and is therefore not itself critiqued by the eruption of the erotic in
moments such as those suggested in the stories from the field. Rather,
memoir invites a view of eroticism at the molecular level, to return the self
to its ambivalence, and to reconsider the self's potential for connection or
abjection. By extension, if the discourse on genocide, the one in which we
are engaged as we deploy the law, as we engage in the "semantic debate,"
maintains the a priori self/other relationship--by such mechanisms as the
will to (and failure of) fusion-that we locate the critique and ask whether
and how we might reconfigure the borderline between them.
The analysis of the discourse is a three-tiered process. First, I have
looked at the operation of the discourse, and the disciplinarity, if you will,
of the erotic within the context of death and suffering. How does the self
see the other across the border (law) as the repository of its antagonism
(alterity)? I have suggested that the self is encoded with the law's fantasy,
which allows the law to accommodate and/or suppress the eruption of the
erotic as connectedness or love, i.e., as the anomaly, within itself. The
eruptions are offered as evidence of the possibility of an escape from the
encoded discourse.
There are two ways in which the moments as "return to the self'
critique the discourse: one is internal, the other external. The internal
critique goes something like this: the law is able to accommodate
uncertainty and ambiguity, at a cost. The cost is the energy expended in
maintaining the discursive borders by suppressing these moments, or
ridding itself of the parties that engage in this subversive or transgressive
behavior vis-a-vis the operation of law. The stories of the moments,
therefore, suggest that the derepression of these moments is itself a
clarification of the way the law works, the way it maintains its fantasy of
unities and the Negative, even as it imbibes and colonizes the Ethical with
respect to the makeup of the self in its relation to the world.
The second, or external, critique suggests that these moments of an
erotic eruption provide an alternative model to the operation of the law,
provide a model of flows and multiplicity, of disunity of discourse, and
allow all stories to constitute the juridical discourse (whereupon Pascal's
alternative definition of genocide would carry weight, at a cost to the law's
requirement that suspects be accorded due process). If we characterize
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those erotic moments as the promise of love, of real connectedness within
an alienated discursive desert (apply the law, strengthen the parapets,
maintain the borders), then an alternative model of flows becomes
appealing.
Both, however, have their weaknesses: if the law already
accommodates ambiguities by rewriting or suppressing them, this merely
speaks to the evolution of the law. If there was a critical mass of erotic
eruptions-let's say sex was rampant, and the lovers insisted that their
Pascals were right and the official record was wrong-surely the law would
shape itself to this reality. In the particular context, the law would carve
out an exception: in Rwanda, the incursions of the interahamwe from
across the border are so pervasive as to redefine the territorial and temporal
jurisdiction of the courts adjudicating the crime of genocide, without
necessarily changing the legal definition or the discourse. In other words,
the internal critique, at least as posited by the erotic eruption, says
somethin,a about what the law already does, 143 but may not critique the law
as such. 1
The second, external critique suffers from a similar weakness. If the
alternative model of flows were indeed realized, its logical conclusion
would be fusion, notwithstanding that unity or fusion may not be the
ostensible object of the model of flows and multiplicity. 145 To be sure,
intimations of fusion within the flows may be J'rovisional, contingent,
fragile, but the possibility of a mystical totality, 14 as Freud put it, would
remain immanent, haunting the discourse of flows as it enabled many more
perspectives and voices to be heard. If fusion is then the spectral object of
the model, at the end of the day it too is no different from the operation of
the discourse as engine or basis for the system as stasis (antagonism).

143
An example from the domestic context is provided by MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY:
A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS 1-2 (1993):
Sex, sin, and blasphemy became major political issues-in the real world but also,
increasingly, in the world of art and imagination. Symbols, words, ideas, and images were
being blamed for social ills. If only America could rid itself of all those pesky artists, all that
crude and irreverent and sometimes violent popular entertainment, surely our social
problems would fade away. And so 'censorship' became a key word in political debate.
Id. at I. Heins goes on to argue, "Does the First Amendment give absolute protection to freedom of
speech? Though the words of the amendment are unequivocal-'Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech'-society and the courts have always recognized exceptions ...." Id.
at 1-2.
144
There is of course the argument that the law, in this exercise, not only reforms itself from within
(exceptionality), but also, paradoxically, exhausts itself and is thereby enervated, static, by continually
combating internal ex-juridical irruptions of the id or unconscious.
145
The object, at least one of them, may be absorption. "The means of the private and individual
apprehension of values are dissolved: with the appearance of Empire, we are confronted no longer with
the local mediations of the universal but with a concrete universal itself." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note
30, at 19. (emphasis added).
146
Both senses of fusion relate to religion. For Hegel, the "Absolute Mind" is rationality divorced from
faith, a transcendence. See, e.g., Alastair Hannay, Introduction to SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND
TREMBLING 10 (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985). For Freud, the mystical totality or the "oceanic"
expresses the religious experience, which he repudiates. See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 70, at 11. "It is a
feeling which he [Romain Rolland in a letter to Freud] would like to call a sensation of 'eternity,' a
feeling as of something limitless, unbounded-as it were, 'oceanic.'" Id.
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What purpose, then, do the stories of erotic eruption provide? They
permit a different perspective on the realization of the self, and by analogy,
of the meaning of sovereignty. By their disruption or insistence within the
juridical narrative (and their substantive absence, their discursive
potentiality), they reflect upon the operation of the law in terms of the will
to centrality, totality, and univocality. But further than that, if those
moments represent the possibility of love, then they bend our attention to
the lovers who, regardless of the basis of those feelings, suggest the space
for feeling, for love at the borderline. The moments provide an alternative
to the dispositif in its central vacuity within, and pursuant to, the juridical
narrative, because the moments are inspired by a desire to connect rather
than absorb and, through the failure of unity, to expunge. 147
Following then is a closer look at borders as suggestive of that which
lies beyond the desire for stability and boundedness: an examination of
borders as porous with respect to the model of flows, and borders as porous
with respect to the possibility of an opening-out to the other, a resituation
(recentering) of the "otherness" within the self.
IV.
A.

POROSITY

THE NORMATIVITY OF STABLE BORDERS, UNDERMINED

Ah, you who join house to house,
who add field to field,
until there is room for no one but you,
and you are left alone in the midst of the landf 148

In this section, I use the erotic moments in the above analysis of
eroticism and the juridical narrative to examine the "stable" border between
self and other in its alternative figurations. The main point will be that the
maintenance of borders is in part a quest for purity. Genocide, or
annihilatory violence, is the ultimate construction of borders, the ultimate
quest for purity though violence. The investment in the discourse on
genocide is the quest for purity through the specular displacement.
As noted, the erotic moments suggested two ways of thinking about
absence (suppression of the erotic) within the discourse. On the one hand,
the moments themselves were wholly extrinsic to the discourse, the work
of the mission continued apace. On the other, each moment expressed
something about the self and its situation within the context of the human
rights work or narrative: in the first story I experienced shame, and in the
second, a sense of loss.
Shame is a kind of "eye power," as Leon Wurmser describes it: "Seeing
meant the ultimate defense against self-loss in merger, shame anxiety
147
See, e.g., VOLF, supra note 20, at 79. "Hegemonic centrality" as analogous to the erotic device: "we
p,enetrate in order to exclude, and we exclude in order to control-if possible everything, alone." Id.
48
Isaiah 5:8.
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pointed to the ultimate danger when such seeing was vanquished:
disappearance." 149 In a sense, the shame expresses my violation of the
discursive code within which the (ocular) moment occurred (the intertext,
so to speak, of the story and the discourse), whereby my desire and envy
threatened to swallow me within the transgression, to deny merger within
the discursive code, and to exclude me. Shame anxiety, then, is a form of
"rescue and restoration." 150 I am returned to the discourse, to the mission,
and to my ethical role, even as that role threatens to "disappear" me (a
stipulation of the dream of fusion).
Seeing, and the eroticism involved, is an escape from the encoded
discourse, a return to the self (or self-interrogation). The second erotic
moment, then, is experienced as a loss of the self as I return to the code, the
recognition that the code represents my ultimate disappearance. But the
importance of such moments is that one returns from oneself to the code
with a different perspective. I take back with me the sense of shame, of
loss; my own parameters have been altered, even if slightly, in relation to
the code. The code's calibrations of my own boundaries are therefore
subject to interrogation. The code's construction of the other as the
repository of violence (the border around the other that segregates him) is
no longer entirely tenable, and this is the caution, the pull, that prevents my
disappearance through or within a narrative of innocence.
But shame has also functioned as a form of purification. It returns me
to the code, it warns me that I will be excommunicated unless I return to
the code, it cautions me that the way to configure the border between self
and other is to maintain the purity of the discourse and the innocence of the
self. Anything else would be disruptive of the code, of "the way things
are." My return, in shame, has brought with it the absence, or insistence, of
an alternative or different way of seeing the relationship between self and
other within the code. The absent alternative, if you will, clarifies the
object of the code, i.e., its calibration of the relationship.
The tension at the border, then, is between an openness to alternatives,
which threatens the self with loss of community, and the suppression of, or
closedness to, alternatives (purified code), which threatens the self with
disappearance within the community. As such, the cycle of a visit to the
self and the return to the code continually clarifies, even exacerbates, the
porosity of the borderline, reiterates its constructedness, and engenders a
complex of choices and ethical frameworks, such as flows or stasis,
multiplicity or unity, as a function of the imbrication of self and other
within the discourse.
Writing about conflict, Kristeva notes that "[s]tability is provisional. It
is the conflicts that are eternal because there is pleasure in conflict." 151 Any
conceptualization of the border must take this into account. Thus, both
149
150

WURMSER, supra note 67, at 122.
Id. at 122-23.

151
JULIA KRISTEVA, REVOLT, SHE SAID 101 (Brian O'Keeffe trans., 2002). She continues: "The
individual, in this return to him or herself, experiences division, conflict, pleasure and jouissance in this
fragmentation. This is the modem version of psychic truth." Id.
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visions of porosity that I will discuss here-the model involving flows, or
the model involving the repentant, recentered self-may be viable
provisionally, i.e., depend for their exercise on conflict, even as their teloi
(totality or perpetual peace) are antithetical to conflict.
Behind the competing visions of porosity lies the conception of borders
as strong, resistant and established. Again, Kristeva: "Pleonexia, greed, is
etymologically the desire 'to possess always more'; it connotes an appetite
that cannot possibly be sated, and that links it, in the writings of Paul for
instance, to sexual transgressions and flesh in general; for the cause of this
appetite resides in idolatry as disobedience to divine speech." 152 The visit
to the self is thus envisaged as a form of pleonexia, an idolatry of the flesh
that competes with the "divine speech" of the code (law as the "decision"
of the sovereign 153). The erotic self in transgression is the self that
interrogates, but the norm of stable borders is strong and persuasive,
valorizing the choice for decisional sovereign, the strong (secure) state.
Indeed, the idea that a return to the self is transgressive suggests the power
of the normativity of stable borders.
Thus, we have three considerations· with respect to the border. First,
there is the stable border, solid and impermeable. Then, there is the porous
border conceived in two different ways: on the one hand, porosity is
contingent, the wall opening up only insofar as it permits the entry to the
center, to reconstitute it as an interdependence of self and other. This is the
theological view. On the other hand, porosity is imagined as a continuous
state, whereby self and other engage in endless, circular flows of desire, a
stream of subjects "decentered and deterritorializing." 154 In the first, a
model of "recentering" is proposed; in the second, a model of "reterritorialization." Porosity, then, is imagined as different visions of an
escape from the normative framework of the stable, unsealable border.
The stable border is normative precisely because of a fear that the
border can be traversed. Thus, scalability is cast as transgressive,
idolatrous. But witness what happens to the self as stabilized by the wall,
or code: stability leads to "hegemonic centrality," because it involves
exclusion. An example is provided by Volf: "The fate of the indigenous
population [of North America] at the hands of the colonizers is not unique;
it is the extreme example of a stable pattern," whereupon Volf quotes from
Isaiah's judgment upon "those who dispossess and drive out others so that
they alone can be the masters of the land." 155 He continues:
152

JULIA KRJSTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 123 (Leon S. Roudiez trans.,
1982).
153
SCHMITT, supra note 34, at 5.
154
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at xii-xiii:
It [i.e., Empire] is a decentered and deteritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively
incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages
hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of
command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and
blended in the imperial global rainbow.
Id.
155
VOLF, supra note 20, at 78. As noted, this is also the model of Empire in its insatiable desire for
absorption. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at xii.
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We exclude because we want to be at the center and be there alone,
single-handedly controlling "the land." To achieve such "hegemonic
centrality," we add conquest to conquest and possession to possession; we
colonize the life-space of others and drive them out; we penetrate in order
to exclude, and we exclude in order to control-if possible everything,
alone. 156

The cycle of returns-to self, to code, and back again-articulates the
normative pull of the code (stability), vests my self with a sense of stability,
independence, and autonomy. As Jacqueline Rose puts it, the very spectre
of traversion, of the "broken identity," more often than not leads to its
opposite: "More simply, I am suggesting that the fixity of identity-for
Freud, for any of us-is something from which it is very hard to escaRe " 157
going on to suggest that "[ f]ragmentation can engender petrification." ss
In Qalqilya, West Bank, "the wall or fence or barrier-it is all these
things in different places," is "transforming the physical and mental
landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," writes Robert Cohen. 159 He
quotes Tom Segev, a historian, to the effect that, '"There is a feeling that
you cannot resolve this situation for the coming decades, you can only
manage it. . . . The wall is ugly and terrible, but it is also a way of
managing. "' 160 On the other side of the fence, Mutassem Abu Tayem, a
Palestinian farmer, with access to his farm only through a tunnel built under
the fence, says, "'We are living in a prison and are treated like beasts. "' 161
The felt need for security under embattled conditions is very real,
Cohen notes, 162 but so is the logic of identity-formation within the
discourse of stable borders. Identity, under the code, tends toward fixity
(petrification), the building of walls of protection that bolster the security
and the hegemonic centrality of the self, leading to accumulation on the one
hand and dispossession/exclusion on the other, which in turn leads to
fragmentation between self and other, and so the cycle continues.
The Israeli-Palestinian border, 430 miles long and projected to cost
over $1 billion, has tunnels. Surely this suggests a kind of porosity? Or are
they, like the law, the exceptions that prove the rule of stability? The
tunnels are heavily guarded and monitored. In discussing the various ways
people exclude, Volf notes two forms: exclusion by elimination (genocide
156

VOLF, supra note 20, at 78-79.
Jacqueline Rose, Response to Edward Said, in FREUD AND THE NON-EUROPEAN 63, 74 (2003).
Id. at 76: "Fragmentation can engender petrification, just as it can be a consequence of historical
alienation that a people, far from dispersing themselves, start digging for a history to legitimate the
violence of the state." Id.
159
Robert Cohen, Building for Calm by Giving Up on Peace, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, § 4, at 14,
available at www.nytimes.com/2004/07 /18/weekinreview/18cohe.html?8h (last visited July 18, 1994).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
If Israelis are going to the beach and to clubs again, and if bombings have become rare, it is
thanks in large part, they insist, to these ditches and guard towers and coils of barbed wire
and miles of wire fencing that separate two peoples, demarcating the gulf between them....
A fence makes the task of Palestinians who want to kill them harder.
Id.
157
158
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in Bosnia, Rwanda), 163 and exclusion by assimilation: "You can survive,
even thrive, among us, if you become like us; you can keep your life, if you
give up your identity ... exclusion by assimilation rests on a deal: we will
refrain from vomiting you out (anthropoemic strategy) if you let us
swallow you up (anthropophagic strategy)." 164 Volf also notes exclusion by
domination, 165 and exclusion by abandonment. 166 All, however, are forms
of symbolic exclusion: "Before excluding others from our social world we
drive them out, as it were from our symbolic world." 167
Volf thus advocates the development of "a complex notion of identity"
that "includes the other." 168 He then names exclusion as such as an
"objective evil," 169 and as "sin," to wit:
Sin is here the kind of purity that wants the world cleansed of the other
rather than the heart cleansed of the evil that drives people out by calling
those who are clean 'unclean' and refusing to help make clean those who
are unclean. Put more formally, sin is 'the will to purity' turned away
from the 'spiritual' life of the self to the cultural world of the other,
transmuted from spirituality into 'politics' broadly conceived .... 170
It is, then, "the pursuit of false purity," 171 -of blood, territory, origins,
and goals 172-that engenders exclusion, and the creation and maintenance
of stable borders to keep the other out. Volf's enterprise is to "decenter"
this "wronrl1-centered self," and to "recenter" the self "by being nailed to
the cross."
Now, although Volf's discussion of borders and exclusion is
theological, I hope to suggest that in its outlines it provides three points
germane to the discourse on genocide as a particular "code": first, there is a
parallel, indeed a fit, between his definition of exclusion and the meaning
163
164
165

VOLF, supra note 20, at 75.
/d.

Id. "We subjugate them so we can exploit them in order to increase our wealth or simply inflate our
e&os."
Id.
1
Id. "Like the priest and the Levite in the story of the Good Samaritan, we simply cross to the other
side and pass by, minding our own business." Id.
167
Id. "Even where explicit and public exclusion is forbidden by formal rules, implicit and private
exclusion still continues, often in the form of unconscious but nonetheless effectual aversion." Id. at 75

n.5.
Symbolic exclusion is often a distortion of the other, not simply ignorance about the other.
We demonize and bestialize not because we do not know better, but because we refase to
know what is manifest and choose to know what serves our interests. That we nevertheless
believe our distortions to be plain verities is no counter-argument; it only underlines that evil
is capable of generating an ideational environment in which it can thrive unrecognized.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 66.
169
Id. at 68. "In my vocabulary, in any case, 'exclusion' does not express a preference; it names an
obiective evil." Id.
17
rr/d at 74.
171
Id. at 74.
tn Id.
The origin and the goal, the inside and the outside, everything must be pure: plurality and
heterogeneity must give way to homogeneity and unity. One people, one culture, one
language, one book, one goal; what does not fall under this all-encompassing 'one' is
ambivalent, polluting, and dangerous. It must be removed ....
Id.
173
Id. at 69.
168

HeinOnline -- 14 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 219 2004-2005

220

Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal

[Vol. 14:181

of the code. Where Volf calls exclusion an "objective evil," I have
suggested that the sex-death complex (code or dispositif) is "imperialistic"
(lex imperii). Second, both have "colonized" the self. 174 Volf uses the
language of evil and sin to describe exclusion, but in its operation the code
leads to the spiral of evil engendered by the promise of purity and
"petrified" identity, especially in the context of conflict. 175 Third, although
Volf's perspective is religious, which means that he stipulates to basic
definitions of right and wrong, good and evil, he recognizes that the views
espousing the "evil" of exclusion as concomitant with a system of
oppression and hierarchy is historical, that it comes "from below," just as
much as the critique of the code is anti-imperialistic, 176 or the subaltern's
discourse. In addition, both critiques have in common an escape from
oppression (or, more exactly, self-oppression) by an interrogative "return to
the self." 177
Because the theological enterprise takes the same critical stance toward
the code and its insistence on stable borders, it is interesting to see how that
critique unfolds, and where it ends up. The religious (or more properly
speaking, the Christian), critique of the self begins with the necessity of
borders (and as such is in agreement with the code and radically differs
from the postmodernists with respect to porosity), but suggests that those
borders be "open" in a particular way. It ends, I suggest, with the
institution of an alternative, bordered universe, a universe of eternal peace
and the terrifying prospect of immortality. I shall compare this with the
postmodern calibration of a borderless world and its telos in a different
kind of totality: the transcendence of identity and of death.

174

Id. at 89.
Why are we such docile, even enthusiastic captives to the system of exclusion? Why is there
so little need for surveillance and force? Why are the subtle disciplinary mechanisms so
effective, to use a phrase of Michel Foucault? Because our very selves have been shaped by
the climate of evil in which we live. Evil has insinuated itself into our very souls and rules
over us from the very citadel erected to guard us against it.
Id. Also, "If people acquiesce, it is not because they are forced to acquiesce, but because there is
something in the texture of their selves that resonates with the logic of exclusion." This relates to
creating borders: "The formation and negotiation of identity always entails the drawing of boundaries,
the setting of the selfas distinct from the other .... " Id. at 90---91.
175
Id. at 99.
The stronger the conflict, the more the rich texture of the social world disappears and the
stark exclusionary polarity emerges around which all thought and practice aligns itself. No
other choice seems available, no neutrality possible, and therefore no innocence sustainable.
. . . Tragically enough, over time the polarity has a macabre way of mutating into its very
opposite-into 'both us and them' that unites the divided parties in a perverse communion of
mutual hate and mourning over the dead.
Id.
176
Id. at 100.
As I read the Christian Scripture, a good deal of its message is written from below, from the
perspective of those who in some sense suffer at the hand of the mighty. The Hebrew
prophets make the injustice of the "little people" into the primary lens through which they
view the mighty, and in God's name they demand that the mighty mend their ways.
Id.
177
Id. at 92. "It is in the citadel of the fragile self that the new world of embrace is first created." 2
Corinthians 5: 17.
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NON-EXCLUSIONARY BORDERS

Volf begins with the question of borders. First, Volf suggests that we
are dialogical beings, the self always and already in relation to the other:
"as Paul Ricoeur has argued in Oneness and Another, 'the selfhood of
oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be
thought of without the other." 178 Second, contrary to Michel Foucault and
other postmodernists, who would "level all the boundaries," 179 Volf
suggests that "Adequate reflection on exclusion must satisfy two
conditions: (1) it must help to name exclusion as evil with confidence
because it enables us to imagine nonexclusionary boundaries that map
nonexclusionary identities; at the same time (2) it must not dull our ability
to detect the exclusionary tendencies in our own judgments and
practices." 180
There are two elements to Volf's development of nonexclusionary
boundaries: differentiation ("separating-and-binding") and judgment. A
third is the specification of the meaning of exclusion as sin, or as the
creation of "impenetrable barriers that prevent a creative encounter with the
other. They are a result either of expulsion or indifference." 181 With
respect to differentiation, Volf suggests that separation, by itself, "would
result in self-enclosed, isolated and self-identical beings." When combined
with "binding," the lines of separation are also lines of connection, barriers
as bridges. The Genesis story illustrates the point:
At first there is a "formless void" (Genesis I :2); "everything in the
universe is all jumbled together," writes Plantinga, and then continues:
"So God begins to do some creative separating: he separates light from
darkness, day from night, water from land, the sea creatures from the land
cruiser ... At the same time God binds things together: he binds humans
to the rest of creation as stewards and caretakers of it, to himself as
bearers of his image, and to each other as perfect complements." 182

Thus, "boundaries are part of the creative process of differentiation.
For without boundaries there would be no discrete identities, and without
discrete identities there could be no relation to the other." 183 Without
boundaries there would only be absorption, the erasure (exclusion) of the
otherness of the other.
178

VOLF, supra note 20, at 66.
Id. at 62-63. "Foucault shares a distaste for boundaries with other postmodern thinkers, such as
Jacques Derrida or Gilles Deleuze . . . . A consistent drive toward inclusion seeks to level all the
boundaries that divide and to neutralize all outside powers that form and shape the self," noting that
"Radical indeterminacy of negative freedom is a stable correlate of a consistent drive toward inclusion
that levels all boundaries." Id. As such, the struggle against exclusion, where it envisages the erasure
of boundaries, "consists in falling into the abyss of nonorder in which the struggle against exclusion
implodes on itself because, in the absence of all boundaries, we are unable to name what is excluded or
why it ought not to be excluded .... " Id. at 64. Volf also asks, "Does not such radical indeterminacy
undermine from within the idea of inclusion, however? I believe it does. Without boundaries we will
be able to know only what we are fighting against but not what we are fighting for." Id. at 63.
180
Id. at 64.
181
Id. at 67.
182
Id. at 65.
183
Id. at 67.
179
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Exclusion is countermanded by differentiation (separation and
binding), and judgment. Whereas judgment is generally "deemed an act of
exclusion," 184 to be repudiated along with other kinds of boundary (for the
postmodemists in their quest for inclusion), Volf attempts to distinguish the
two: in effect, judgment is in fact "the distinction between 'differentiation'
and 'exclusion,"' i.e., some judgments, as with boundaries, are good
(nonexclusionary), others bad (exclusionary). For the postmodemists such
as Richard Rorty, borders and judgments are eliminated when we concede
that all are contingent and oppressive. Volf replies that "contingency does
not, as [Rorty] puts it, go 'all the way down,' and that there are values
which 'time and change' cannot alter because 'time and change' did not
bring them about." 185 Precisely one of those judgments is that exclusion
(rather than differentiation) is defined as an "objective evil." 186
Whereupon, "[a] judgment that names exclusion as an evil and
differentiation as a positive good, then, is itself not an act of exclusion. To
the contra~ such judgment is the beginning of the struggle against
exclusion." 7
The crux of the difference between Volf and the postmodemists, or
between their competing visions of porosity, is precisely in the different
positive content (or lack of content) of those visions. Whereas the
postmodemists depend upon a negative frame of reference, indeed a
negative center of the self (decentered selves), 188 Volf and the Christians
suggest the opposite: the self is always centered, always in dialogical
relation to the other, and always in the creative process of maintaining a
center. 189 The belief in a centered self is antipodal to the belief in a
decentered self. Indeed, it is this idea of the self as a vessel, a container,
which is radically different from the postmodern project. This is also
evident in Volf's definition of the borders, at every point taking the
negative index and infusing it with substance: separation (negative) is
coupled with binding (positive); judgment (exclusion, negative) is coupled
with values, or the positive belief in the evil of exclusion ~not just its
contingency) and in the stipulation of "right and wrong beliefs." 90

Id.
Id. at 68 (quoting RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xv (1989)).
186
Id. "! reject exclusion because the prophets, evangelists, and apostles tell me that this is a wrong
way to treat human beings, any human being, anywhere, and I am persuaded to have good reasons to
believe them." Id.
181 Id.
188
Id. at 70. "If there is no center to the self, then there are only different ways of weaving new
candidates for belief and desire into antecedently existing webs of belief and desire." Id. (quoting
RORTY, supra note 185, at xv). Volfadds, "The ironic stance is a posture ofa centerless self." Id.
189 Id.
Though the self may lack an 'objective' and 'immovable' center, the self is never without a
center; it is always engaged in the production of its own center. 'Weaving' would be a rather
innocent way to describe this production, possibly a fitting image for how Rorty's books are
written but not for how human selves are shaped. 'Struggle' and 'violence' come closer to
being an adequate description.
Id.
190
Id. at 69. "[T]here are right and wrong beliefs and desires, not only antecedent and subsequent
beliefs and desires." Id.
184
185
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The self's center is constituted by those negative indexes without the
balance of the positive ones. This is why, for the postmodernists, it is a
"decentered self': it is constituted by exclusion.
That is, the
postmodernists make two moves: they define all borders as disciplinary and
oppressive, and advocate their erasure; and they define the self as
constituted by these disciplinary measures, thereby eliminating, along with
"essential essences," any center altogether: the self is pure contingency.
The self is the Negative: it is not. It is empty, pure "irony," in Rorty's
terms. For the postmodernists, this is its strength: the negative is freedom
(negative liberty, freedom from the oppressiveness of borders). But for
Volf, decenteredness as the Negative means, in effect, a centeredness
constituted by exclusion itself. Thus, to counteract the Negative, the first
move is to define the Negative, to make a judgment (a boundary) based on
an a priori value system, to mark the limit of the Negative with a positive
value. That move is to define "decenteredness" as in fact the "wronglycentered" self. And that move has been anticipated by defining exclusion
itself as an objective evil. If the self as "decentered" is the Negative, then a
fortiori it has already excluded all, including the other: it is in fact
constituted by exclusion. In a word, the self is "centered" by evil.
Volf's project is to decenter this self and recenter it; that is, to fill it
with content, or rather, with a substantively Positive value to defeat the
Negative. 191 As a wrongly-centered (or decentered) self it is, qua
exclusion, prey to the two performances (enactments) of emptiness:
accumulation and dispossession. It is the very model, in short, of the fixed
and stable border, of the imperialist self. This is the substance of Volf's
critique of the postmoderns: that the very model of inclusion, based upon a
philosophy of negative liberty, 192 advocated by emptying the self of
content-eradicating all boundaries, locating contingency "all the way
down," articulating the self, the "I," in flows and transient inscriptions, the
self utterly free to weave its own beliefs and desires-is in fact the
fulfillment of the imperialist drive. The decentered self is the code.
The opposite of this self constituted by exclusion and severance is the
self that is committed and bound: instead of freedom, love. 193 But this is
191
Id. at 70. "Whichever way the 'centering' takes place and whatever its result, the self should be decentered, claims Paul. The word he uses to describe the act is 'crucified,' a word which tells a story
whose high points are Good Friday and Easter." Id. Also, "[t]he self is both 'de-centered' and 'recentered' by one and the same process, by participating in the death and resurrection of Christ through
faith and baptism." Id.
192
Id. at 102.
Both liberal and socialist projects-the two major visions for organizing social life under the
conditions of modemity---center on the idea of freedom. As Zygmunt Bauman observed in
Postmodern Ethics, the Grand Idea at the heart of modern restlessness, [the] guiding lantern
perched on the prow of modernity's ship, was the idea of emancipation: an idea which draws
its meaning from what it negates and against which it rebels-from the shackles it wants to
fracture, the wounds it wants to heal-and owes its allure to the promise of negation.
Id. As such, "Oppression is the negativity, liberation its negation, freedom the resulting positivity." Id.
193
Volf suggests substituting this "negative" quality with something positive:
The categories 'oppression/liberation' seem ill-suited to bring about reconciliation and
sustain peace between people and people groups .... As a consequence, we need to reject
'freedom' as the ultimate social goal. ...The father of Latin American Liberation Theology,
Gustavo Gutierez, was right to insist that love, not freedom is ultimate.
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not so simple, and herein lies the rub. Recentering the self requires a return
to the self that is described by some as "destroying," 194 others (including
Volt) as a "crucifixion." And in that word is packed all the violence and
passion that is required of the self to overcome the Negative.
In large, historical and political terms, the self has been battered;
indeed, Volf suggests that the tendency to exclude-including the exclusion
or escape from one's own traumatized self-is often a consequence of
having suffered exclusion from others, 195 just as the tendency to "petrify" is
a result of the trauma of self-fragmentation, especially within the context of
conflict. Cohen suggests that Israelis, terrorized and exhausted by the
suicide bombs, were by and large grateful for the wall, even if it was
merely a form of "damage limitation"; but the cost of the panacea, of
course, is that they have given up the hope for peace. 196 The first critique
of Volf, then, is that the decentered self, the self that is in fact continuous
with the code (the self from which I experienced shame as I momentarily,
in a moment of lust, "escaped" it), is the product of strongly felt and
perdurable historical and cultural forces. To give up that self, to relinquish
the desire for stable borders, the quest for fusion and a self that belongs to a
community by blood, soil, origin, or goal, to open the wall to the other, is in
fact revolutionary; it is a violent and radical act. It is an act of renunciation
(renouncing the flesh, the I as the engineer of change 197).
Id. at 104-05.
194
Id. at 70: "'Destroying' is the word Reinhold Niebuhr used in The Nature and Destiny of Man to
render Paul's 'crucifying.'" Volf suggests that the word is "too radical, for Paul clearly has in view a
continued life of that same self after its 'crucifixion."' Id.
195
Id. at 92.
The desire for identity could also explain why so many people let themselves be sinned
against so passively-why they Jet themselves be excluded. It is not simply because they
may lack a sufficiently strong will to be themselves, but because one can satisfy the will to
be oneself by surrendering to the other. Their problem is not so much exclusion of the other
from their will to be oneself, but a paradoxical exclusion of their own self from the will to be
oneself-what feminist theologians call 'diffusion of the self' (Saiving 1979, 37f.). As a
rule, exclusion of the self from the will to be oneself comes about as a result of acts of
exclusion that we suffer. Hence it is not so much sin as it is an evil that cries for remedy.
The exclusion of the self from the will to be oneself not only damages the self, but makes the
slippage into exclusion on the part of the other and therefore further damaging of the self so
much easier.
Id.
196
Cohen, supra note 159.
Most Israelis are tired of the conflict, exhausted by it. They want to forget what goes on
over there, in the West Bank. A wall helps them do that. They feel peace was within reach
in the l 990's, but now the best that can be hoped for is damage limitation. A fence makes
the task of Palestinians who want to kill them harder.
Id.
197
VOLF, supra note 20, at 110.
For Christian faith to give up the hope for the final reconciliation-for reconciliation that
can neither be surpassed nor undone-would mean to give itself up. Everything depends,
however, on how we understand the final reconciliation and its implications for life in a
world of enmity. I will offer here only three brief disclaimers. First, the final reconciliation
is not a work of human beings but of the triune God. Second, it is not an apocalyptic end of
the world but the eschatological new beginning of this world. Third, the final reconciliation
is not a self-enclosed "totality" because it rests on a God who is nothing but a perfect love.
The hope for such "nontotalitarian" final reconciliation is the backdrop against which
Christians engage in the struggle for peace under the conditions of enmity and oppression.
Id.
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The second critique regarding the project of porosity proposed by Volf
is that the self as Negative, notwithstanding the will to death (nothingness)
it adumbrates, has enabled hybridity, multiplicity, human rights, and
freedom. It may be a negative freedom, and radically flawed for its false
promises or the underside of self-alienation, but Volf concedes its benefits:
To a person, such as myself, who experienced 'all the blessings' of
communist rule, the suggestion that there is no truth to the liberal
narrative of inclusion and the claim that its consequences are mainly
unfortunate sounds not only unpersuasive but dangerous. Similarly, most
women and minorities would not want to give up the rights they now
have; and most critics of liberal democracies would rather live in a
democracy than in any of the available alternatives. The ~rogress of
'inclusion' is one important thing to celebrate about modernity. 98

The project whereby "[t]hose who are conveniently left out of the modern
narrative of inclusion because they disturb the integrity of its 'happy
ending' plot demand a long and gruesome counter-narrative of
exclusion" 199 is true. And even they, traumatized by conflict, trodden
underfoot by hegemons, or disenfranchised even within the enlightened
democracies, will not easily give up the story of inclusion and its promises.
The third critique of the project of love subtends its own content. We
exclude, we judge, in "the pursuit of false purity," as Volf says. And yet,
we live in a material world of dangers and compromises: openness to the
other may still require us to secure our homes and persons frqm the threat
of violation. It is true that conflict exacerbates the tendencies toward
closedness of identity, but even in the "rich texture of the social world"200 I
face the possibility of my own disappearance in small ways.
A fourth critique, probably the most obvious to the secular mind, is the
question of repentance. If I acknowledge that I am filled with sin (the
Negative), and must repent, then redemption comes in the form of a
particular belief system and access to a new community, indeed, a new
code. I must be "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible,
by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever."201 This code, like
the old one, has bordered selves (but the borders are "nonexclusionary")
and centered subjects (but the center is filled with "self-giving love"202 ). Its
positive content, like the negative emptiness of the old code, also holds the
promise of stabili!Y and fusion with God, and with the brethren of
"unfeigned love." 203 It promises forgiveness and reincorporation for the sin
of transgression (my moment of shame), especially for the transgression of
traversing the spiritual will to purity by excluding the other on the basis of
culture or politics (false purity, false judgment). Its telos is the life
hereafter. "For now we see through a glass, darkly, but then face to face:
198

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 99.
201
I Peter I :23.
202
VOLF, supra note 20, at 71. "For Christians, this 'decentered center' of self-giving love-most firmly
centered and most radically open-is the doorkeeper of the self." Id.
203
I Peter I :22.
199
200
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now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known."204
The discursive, material, and imperialist code, meanwhile, also has its
telos, through an eroticization of the violence of the I, in death.
Despite these critiques or, depending on one's point of view because of
them (and the immanence they promise), the beauty of Volf's project is in
what it permits us to apprehend about the discursive code, about ourselves,
about the potential and the choices, that there are in fact choices with
respect to our situation within the code. The project clarifies the "passivity
beyond passivity"205 of the code and the possibility, indeed the urgency, of
active engagement with the juridical discourse, the self, and alterityantagonism.
Thus, Volf's project of a return to the self may on the one hand be
similar to the yearning for stable borders (as in the discourse on genocide)
but characterizes "exceptions" as the neutral space within which the self is
permitted, albeit violently, to encounter its alterity. It is the antagonistic
struggle as "agon,"206 in Mouffe's expression. Volf meets the violence of
the code with a violence of its own, a turning away from the other as
violence (exporting or displacing the violence to the other "out there,"
intervening to "redeem" the other), a turning toward the other as other in
dialogical relation to the self; it is the violence of the recentered and
interrogating self (crucifixion, repentance, 207 self-redemption).
But the porosity proposed by postmodernism, and critiqued by Volf,
also has some common elements with the code (stable borders), as well as,
perhaps counterintuitively, with Volf's project. The theological posit of
porosity is an escape from exclusionary borders and returns eroticism to
love beyond the self (God, the hereafter). The secular postmodern proposal
similarly takes the self beyond self-interrogation to a oneness with nature
and the universal. 208 In the following, I will briefly outline how
postmodernism, and in particularly Hardt and Negri's critique of the
postmodern sovereign, shares with Volf's vision specific fundamental
elements: each involves a form of what Edward Said refers to as
204
205

1Corinthians13:12.

GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION 13-14
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) "Levinasian 'passivity beyond passivity', the idea of ethics as the egoless substitution of one for 'the other."' Id.
206
MOUFFE, supra note 61, at 4.
201
Volf defines repentance as follows:
But he [Jesus] demanded more than a radical alteration. To repent means to make a
turnabout of a profound moral and religious import. Repentance implies not merely a
recognition that one has made a bad mistake, but that one has sinned. Jesus stated explicitly
that he came 'to call not the righteous but the sinners' and the evangelists report that he was
engaged in the practice of 'forgiving sins.'
VOLF, supra note 20, at 113.
208
See, e.g., Seem, supra note 138, at xxi:
Once we forget about our egos a non-neurotic form of politics becomes possible, where
singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds with each other, and where collective
expressions of desire are possible. Such a politics does not seek to regiment individuals
according to a totalitarian system of norms, but to de-normalize and de-individualize through
a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements against power. Its goal is the transformation
of human relationships in a struggle against power.

Id.
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"askesis"209 (renunciation): in Volf, it is repentance, whereas in the secular
critiques it is "deterritoriality " ego-lessness. Both critiques of the code
depend upon a transcendenf10 being, whether the Messiah or the AntiOedipus, for purification and redemption. 211 Both also, even as they
critique the code, replicate many of its basic elements, such as an ultimate
vision of stability and, indeed, fusion (freedom and/or love). 212 And finally,
both are religious or quasi-religious responses to the problem of the self
and its relationship to the other. This should not be surprising; as Benedict
Anderson has noted, "The extraordinary survival over thousands of years of
Buddhism, Christianity or Islam in dozens of different social formations
attests to their imaginative response to the overwhelmin¥.i burden of human
suffering-disease, mutilation, grief, age, and death."2
He goes on to
note, "The great weakness of all evolutionary/progressive styles of thought,
not excluding Marxism, is that such questions are answered with impatient
silence."214
On the contrary, however,
I suggest that
evolutionary/progressive thought-notwithstanding Freud's famous
dismissal of religion215-to the extent at least that such thought is
exegetical it borrows from religion's "imaginative response" to human
woes.

209

SAID, supra note 14, at 14.
See also various definitions of "ascesis," available at
www.sicetnon.com/textflorilegium/ascesis.htm (last visited July 21, 2004). '"To overflow,' that is the
secret liquid passion, the one that knows no measure. And over-flowing does not signify plenitude, but
emptiness, the excess by comparison to which fullness is still lacking." (citation omitted). Id.
21
For the connection between fusion/unity and transcendence, see, e.g., GARY B. MADISON & MARTY
FAIRBAIRN,THE ETHICS OF POSTMODERNITY: CURRENT TRENDS IN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT 9
(Northwestern Univ. 1999).
Charles Scott addresses one of the longstanding issues in ethical theory: transcendence. He
seeks to put thoroughly in question the sense of transcendence that is our philosophical
heritage in order to maximize the struggle in it, to interrupt the powerful suggestion of unity
that the sense of transcendence often carries with it.
Id.
211
See, e.g., Seem, supra note 138, at xxiii.
Anti-Oedipus is an individual or a group that no longer functions in terms of beliefs and that
comes to redeem mankind, as Nietzsche foresaw, not only from the ideals that weighed it
down, 'but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to
nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will
again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this AntiChrist and antinihilist
.... He must come one day.' (citation omitted).
Id.
212
See, e.g., id. for the similarity between the erotic device and the anti-oedipal: with the
"oedipalization of desire" comes "the effusion in it of a death instinct [that must be] exorcise[ d]" by the
anti-oedipal. This purification program is also expressed in the following: "The first task of the
revolutionary, [Deleuze and Guattari] add, is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal
yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs." Id.
at xx-xxi.
213
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 18 {Verso 1983).

°

21•
215

/d.

See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 70, at 22.
The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly
attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able
to rise above this view of life. It is still more humiliating to discover how large a number of
people living today, who cannot but see that this religion is not tenable, nevertheless try to
defend it piece by piece in a series of pitiful rearguard actions.

Id.
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As such, in the following, I suggest the points of commonality between
all three "territorial," if you will, systems of address to the self: (a) the
code's requirements for fixity and its promise of fusion; (b) Volf's "porous"
borders, a porosity that largely promises a substantive alternative to the
code; and (c) Hardt and Negri's critique of the postmodern sovereign's
"porosity" that also represents another anti-imperialist alternative to the
code. The alternatives see the code as both postmodern and imperialist,
even as postmodern thought promises a "way out" of imperialism. Deleuze
and Guattari, for instance, promise to discover "the desiring-machines that
escape such codes ~i.e., the Oedipal as the imperial] as lines of escape
leading elsewhere." 6 The task ahead is to conceive of a neutral space, an
"elsewhere" that permits the self to face its alterity and, thereby, disinvest
in the stabilizing displacement of its violence to the elsewhere.
C.

BORDERLESSNESS: RENUNCIATION AND REVOLUTION

[SJpace contributes to a feeling of coherence and safety; to be without a
home is to be a refugee-bewildered, disoriented, psychically frozen.
-John Lah? 17
Addressing the extent to which the postmodern vision of flows and
hybridity is similar both to the discourse on genocide as a mode of
imperialism and to the Christian return to the self requires, once more, a
review of the erotic as a disciplinary dispositif. 218 One indication of this
common principle is found in Hardt and Negri's analysis of postmodern
imperialism, and their insistence on the "newness" of the postmodern
sovereign. Because of this newness, new tools are needed to contest it. It
is within the rhetoric of newness that is found the religious or quasireligious dimension of their project. There, elements in common with
Volf's proposal include messianism, secular repentance/renewal, and an
ultimate vision of the oneness of mankind, a kind of fusion 219 with its
The (postmodern) concept of renunciation
promise of stability.
incorporates these elements.
My argument here is that when we apprehend the redemptive register
of the discourse on genocide, we may understand both how our ethical
agency with respect to the other has been shaped by the discourse, and how
the discourse intimates alternatives, within the gaps. Redeeming the other
is what we do within the discourse, how we define and situate victims,
216

Seem, supra note 138, at xvii.
Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party),
and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the
'deterritorialized' flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes
and the neuticized [sic] territorialities, the desiring-machines that escape such codes as lines
of escape leading elsewhere.

Id.

217

John Lahr, Down and Out: Twenty-Seven Characters in Search of a Play, THE NEW YORKER, May
31, 2004, at 93.
"Disciplinary society is that society in which social command is constructed through a diffuse
network of dispositifs or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive
Yiractices." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 23.
19
Empire evinces "the tendency toward the centralized and unitary regulation of both the world market
and global power relations." Id. at 23.
218
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martyrs, evildoers, and the juridical outsider capable of salvific
intervention. Whereas Volf fights the violence with a violence from within
(spiritual "purity of heart"), Hardt and Negri suggest using the violence
within (we are constituted or im-mediated by the sovereign, it has
exhausted time and space) to fight the violence without (supranational
power of rule). Secular postmodemism promises a kind of fusion that
transcends the border of difference, thereby overcoming the "psychically
frozen" homelessness of the self.
Postmodern hybridity (borderlessness) begins with the negation of self
(Volf calls this "exclusion" pure and simple), but, unlike the dispositif,
without the borders. The dispositif expunges the violence of the self to the
other, whereupon it becomes a "redemptive" exercise to save the other
imperial force deployed to bring civilization to the savages, and so on. 220
The postmodern sovereign does the same, through its colonization of space
and time and, thereby, the "deterritorialization" of the self. The same
gesture that enables the sovereign to co-opt the idealist or progressivist
agenda also holds out the promise, for the self, of a renunciation. That is,
the self may contest sovereignty through an "ethics of refusal." 221
One index of renunciation here is in Hardt and Negri's insistence that
the postmodern or "total" sovereign is a new and radical break from the
past, the old self: modem sovereignty marks "a paradigm shift," 222 and the
sovereign is "a single power that overdetermines [all former structures of
power], structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one
common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and
postimperialist. "223 The sovereign is "a new notion of right, or rather, a
new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms
and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve
conflicts. "224
This newness is also "ontological,"225 in the sense that it reveals the
deep implication of the subjectivity of the self in relation to the sovereign.
In effect, the subject is created by the sovereign: "Life has now become ...
220

Volf describes this process thus: "Others become scapegoats, concocted from our own shadows as
repositories for our sins and weaknesses so we can relish the illusion of our sinlessness and strength."
VOLF, supra note 20, at 78.
221
See, e.g., Tawia Ansah, Surprised by Sin: Human Rights and Universality, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 307, 317 (2003). Hardt & Negri propose an alternative to refusal:
Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal, we need also to construct a new mode
of life and above all a new community. This project leads not toward the naked life of homo
tantum but toward homohomo, humanity squared, enriched by the collective intelligence and
love of the community.
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 204.
222
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 8.
223
Id. at 9.
22• Id.
225
Id. at I 0.
While studying and critiquing the new forms of international and supranational law, then, we
will at the same time be pushed to the heart of the political theory of Empire, where the
problem of supranational sovereignty, its source of legitimacy, and its exercise bring into
focus political, cultural, and finally ontological problems.
Id.
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an object of power."226 It is also "exhaustive."227 It could not be more
radical, nor more in line with Schmitt's absolute state. 228 That is, the
ethical agenda of the modem sovereign is the same: "The traditional
concept of just war involves the banalization of war and the celebration of
it as an ethical instrument." Secularism attempted to expunge these
concepts, but "[t]hese two traditional characteristics have reappeared in our
postmodern world: on the one hand, war is reduced to the status of police
action, and on the other, the new power that can legitimately exercise
ethical functions through war is sacralized. " 229 Coupled, then, with the
radical newness of the sovereign is this sacral purpose of empire at the
core. 230 The postmodern sovereign, through war as the rule, promises a
"return" to the pure or ethical self, but it is the old, imperial self, newly
consecrated (sacralized).
The new sovereign engenders hierarchical stability, which resembles
the stability and obduracy of the stable borders (the dispositif) in another
way:
[It is] a machine that creates a continuous call for authority. The machine
seems to predetermine the exercise of authority and action across the
entire social space. Every movement is fixed and can seek its own
designated place only within the system itself, in the hierarchical
relationship accorded to it. This preconstituted movement defines the
reality of the process of the imperial constitutionalization of world
order-the new paradigm. 231
If this rigidity seems antithetical to the self constituted by the sovereign

state as the site of "deterritorialized and reterritorializing" 232 flows of
desire, consider again the similarity to the disciplinary dispositif: the free
flows engender the very constraints that channel them; this is the essence of
the negative liberty here achieved. Naming "corruption" as "the sign of the
absence of any ontology," Hardt and Negri suggest that
Imperial sovereignty thrives on the proliferating contradictions corruption
gives rise to; it is stabilized by its instabilities, by its impurities and
226

Id. at 24 (quoting Michel Foucault, Les Mailles du Pouvoir, in DITS ET ECRITS 194 (Paris: Gal\imard
1944)).
227
There is "an ethico-political dynamic at the heart of is juridical concept" with two fundamental
elements: "a boundless space" and "all time ... Empire exhausts historical time." Id. at 11.
228
The "production" of life refers to the power of the sovereign to wage war: "The state as the decisive
political entity possesses an enormous power: the possibility of waging war and thereby publicly
disposing of the lives of men. The jus belli contains such a disposition. It implies a double possibility:
the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies,"
SCHMITT, supra note 71, at 46.
229
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30 at 12.
230
"(T]he right of the police is legitimated by universal values." Id. at 18.
231
Id. at 14.
232
On the erasure of barriers between global and local:
The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local
might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or
perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global
moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim
that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against
the global flows of capital and Empire.
Id. at 45.
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admixture; it is calmed by the panic and anxieties it continually
engenders. Corruption names the perpetual process of alteration and
metamorphosis, the anti-foundational foundation, the deontological mode

ofbeing.~ 33
It is to escape from this mode of the modem state, to renounce and

refuse its "ontological dualism," and to embrace a different kind of
ontology, a utopia of "love,"234 that sets the anti-imperialist (and
communist) schema of the postmodern critical project. But the point
requires the embrace of the "interiorized"235 mechanisms of oppression that
constitute the sovereign, as well as a refusal of the idea of "immediate"
sovereignty, that leads to the circularity and reinscription of imperialist
thinking. To fight sovereign one must be the sovereign; immediation
becomes its own strength.
The first embrace is with respect to borders and borderlessness. In a
section entitled "There Is No More Outside,"236 Hardt and Negri outline
the various modem and postmodern critiques of the traditional dualities;
critiques against the them/us, inside/out dichotomies, they suggest, are no
more than the "blackmail of bourgeois realism."237 The call for the erasure
of borders implicates the erasure of politics. 238 And this is their warning:
the nature of power has so changed, so inseminated and invested our bodies
and souls, that there is no mediation between subject and supranational
power. 239 There is no "outside" that is "evil"; to use the theological
233

Id. at 202.
Id. at 186.
Spinoza takes on the theoretical challenge to establish full knowledge of truth and discover
the path of the liberation of the body and the mind, positively, in the absolute.... Spinoza's
primary objective is the ontological development of the unity of true knowledge and the
powerful body along with the absolute construction of singular and coJlective immanence
.... The desire (cupiditas) that rules the course of the existence and action of nature and
humans is made Jove (amor}-which invests at once both the natural and the divine.
Id. Hardt & Negri note that Spinoza failed to realize his vision, which resolved in a "search for an
outside," which "seems to run aground and propose merely phantasms of mysticism, negative intuitions
of the absolute ... ."Id.
235
Id. at 23.
The behaviors of social integration and exclusion proper to rule are thus increasingly
interiorized within the subjects themselves. Power is now exercised through machines that
directly organize the brains (in communication systems, information networks, etc.) and
bodies (in welfare systems, monitored activities, etc.) toward a state of autonomous
alienation from the sense of life and the desire for creativity.
Id.
236
Id. at 186.
237
Id. at 185. "The power of the modem critique of modernity resides precisely where the blackmail of
bourgeois realism is refused-in other words, where utopian thought, going beyond the pressures of
homology that always limit it to what already exists, is given a new constituent form." Id.
238
Id. at 188-89 (referring to the aforementioned "omni-crisis"). For the proposition that the end of
politics is the beginning of the polemical, see Alan Wolfe, The New Pamphleteers: When the
Establishment Disappears, Polemics Fill the Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 7 (Book Review), at 13,
stating:
Pamphleteering is what happens when no one-editorial writers, university professors,
publishing executives-is doing much "filtering." Without strong political parties and
powerful labor unions, Arianna Huffington's and Sean Hannity's politics is the kind of
politics you get. For all their ugliness of language and unpersuasive fury, then, the current
crop of political pamphlets bears a striking resemblance to the increasingly democratic
culture in which they flourish.
239
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 138.
234

HeinOnline -- 14 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 231 2004-2005

Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal

232

[Vol. 14:181

language of Volf, we are all sinners. Thus, the critiques of the sovereign in
terms of porosity and the promise of fusion must be refused.
Hardt and Negri's post-postmodern project, however, not only calls for
the acceptance of the sovereign-as-myself as the means of fighting the
modem state, it does so in a way that reinscribes the sacrality of the
undertaking. First, sacrality is most evident in this refusal of the
postmodern project, the renunciation of the reterritorialization of the "I" as
the singular and autonomous integer of sovereignty, and in the
promulgation of a messianic figure: the self, really, as Everyman, the
collective-as-one (an alternative or communitarian reterritorialization).
This "return to the self' as collective (recall Volf's "brethren in Christ")
depetrifies the homelessness and isolation of the imperial refugee, filled but
perdurably emptied by imperial desire. It is a reterritorialization that
repudiates the negativity of the erotic dispositif. Precisely because the
return is to the self as constituted by imperial, immediated power,240 the
return is an "interior" reorganization of borders, an internal
reconceptualization, indeed recreation, with intimations of a divine agency
involved. This self, with its synthetic,241 utopic, even religious242 allusions
(the new, militant, and politicized self is beyond the "refusal" of the
negative dispositif) is ready to do battle with the system "from within":
Today the militant cannot ever pretend to be a representative, even of the
fundamental human needs of the exploited. Revolutionary political
militancy today, on the contrary, must rediscover what has always been its
proper form: not representational but constituent activity. ... Here is the
strong novelty of militancy today: it repeats the virtues of insurrectional
action of two hundred years of subversive experience, but at the same
time it is linked to a new world, a world that knows no outside. It knows
only an inside, a vital and ineluctable participation in the set of social
[I]t is important to investigate the utility of [postmodern and postcolonial] theories in the
context of the new paradigm of power. This new enemy not only is resistant to the old
weapons but actually thrives on them, and thus joins its would-be antagonists in applying
them to the fullest. Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries!
Id.
240

Id. at 26. "All the intermediary elements of the process have in fact fallen aside, so that the
legitimacy of the international order can no longer be constructed through mediations but must rather be
grasped immediately in all its diversity," and further: "This [i.e., Empire] is a radical transformation that
reveals the unmediated relationship between power and subjectivities, and hence demonstrates both the
impossible or 'prior' mediations and the uncontainable temporal variability of the event."
Id.

241

Id. at 132 (referring to the postcolonial politics of Franz Fanon and Malcolm X).

This open negativity is merely the healthy expression of a real antagonism, a direct relation
of force. Because it is not the means to a final synthesis, this negativity is not a politics in
itself; rather, it merely poses a separation .... The real political process of constitution will
have to take place on this open terrain of forces with a positive logic, separate from the
dialectics of colonial sovereignty.
Id.
242

Id. at 393.

The great masses need a material religion of the senses [eine sinnliche Religion]. Not only
the great masses but also the philosopher needs it. Monotheism of reason and the heart,
polytheism of the imagination and art, this is what we need .... [W]e must have a new
mythology, but this mythology must be at the service of ideas. It must be a mythology of
reason.
Id. (citation omitted).
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structures, with no possibility of transcending them. . . . This militancy
makes resistance into counterpower and makes rebellion into a project of
love. 243

Thus, as the newness of the postmodern sovereign's return to a pure,
ethical self is really the reconsecration (resacralization) of an old imperial
self, so also the "novelty" of the postmodern anti-imperialism posited by
Hard and Negri is a reconsecration of an old militancy of "two hundred
years of subversive experience," promising "a new world" of unity and the
transcendence of the individuated self.
So there we have it: within refusal is the construction of a new mode of
life, creating "humanity squared"; 244 reterritorialization, similar to Volf's
nonexclusionary borders, is the promise of communalism. And while the
secular open space encountering the code's rigid borders appears radical
and new (a paradigm shift), the rhetorical register is religious: the
"constituent" figure (messianic) at the conclusion of Hardt and Negri's
analysis is Saint Francis of Assisi, patron saint of ascesis. Hardt and Negri
point to his renunciation of the material world (proto-capitalism) in order to
use its own captivating and colonizing tools against it. Thus, renunciation
goes beyond merely an ethics of refusal, a breed of the Negative, to an
ethics of love and the quest for purity and innocence: St. Francis presents a
utopian vision of oneness with God, nature, and humankind. 245
But St. Francis, accordin:i§ to legend, received his ethical and
transcendent calling in dreams. 6 And so we return to the code and the
fantasy of fusion with which we began. Will either the Christian or the
secular alternatives fulfill the dream and thereby obviate the cycle of
abjection, projection, and alienation within which we are steeped as
discursive subjects of the code? It is not, I submit, a criticism to say that
despite, or perhaps because of, the radical nature of the alternatives as
243
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Id. at 413.
Id. at 26.
Id. at413.
There is an ancient legend that might serve to illuminate the future life of the communist
militancy: that of Saint Francis of Assisi. Consider his work. To denounce the poverty of
the multitude he adopted that common condition and discovered there the ontological power
of a new society. The communist militant does the same, identifying in the common
condition of the multitude its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism
refused every instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh (in
poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including all of being and
nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and the
exploited humans, together against the will of power and corrupti9n. Once again in
postmodernity we find ourselves in Francis's situation, posing against the misery of power
the joy of being. This is a revolution that no power will control-because biopower and
communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also
innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist.

Id.
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See, e.g., PASCHAL ROBINSON, St. Francis ofAssisi, in THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOLUME VI,
available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/0622la.htm (last modified Nov. 3, 2004), stating:
His biographers tell us that the night before Francis set forth he had a strange dream in
which he saw a vast hall hung with armor all marked with the Cross. 'These,' said a voice,
'are for you and your soldiers.' 'I know I shall be a great prince,' exclaimed Francis
exultingly, as he started for Apulia. But a second illness arrested his course at Spoleto.
There, we are told, Francis had another dream in which the same voice bade him turn back
to Assisi. He did so at once. This was 1205.
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departures from the narrative of stability engendered by the bordered other,
there is still the insinuation of the normative discourse present in both. On
the contrary, with the necessity of rupture (transgression), the promise of
fusion (eroticism as love), and the strong temptation that this promise will
draw you back into the code, the alternatives have mandated a return to the
self as the site of self-interrogation. 247
As such, one may ask: is a "neutral space" conceivable at the porous
borderline? Can the self face its own antagonistic alterity? Precisely at the
border, we see ourselves in relation to the suffering of others. We pause to
consider the erotic and sepulchral complicities-political and moral-of
the juridical discourse as a seductive fantasy 248 of innocence.
V.

CONCLUSION: MY ALTERITY

et le negre chaque }our plus bas, plus /ache, plus sterile, moins profond,
plus repandu au-dehors, plus separe de soi-meme, plus ruse avec soimeme, moins immediat avec soi-meme,
j'accepte, j'accepte tout cela.
-Aime Cesaire249
The postmodern sovereign (defining the United States as superpower,
or s1Wiranationalism as power beyond the allegedly declining Wes!ghalian
state 0) denotes a global world as "a new constellation of power." 1 The
world may seem to be divided between the stable democracies and the
many smaller, struggling countries where crises flare up. But when, I
suggest, we go behind that conception of "our" situation vis-a-vis "theirs,"
and when we consider the nature of modem sovereignty as reinforcing the
suppression of "my alterity" by displacing violence to the chaotic other, we
247

See KRJSTEVA, supra note 51, at 101. "The return to oneself leads the individual to question his
truth, much like what is accomplished with philosophical dialogues, for example Plato's. Something
that prayer and all forms of meditation also accomplish according to St. Augustine." Id. at 100.
248
For the constructive utility of fantasies of fusion, see FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 35
(discussing on the "fantasy bond" created by the child to compensate for the lack of fusion with the
mother at an early age).
Early in the developmental sequence, the infant or child compensates for emotional
deprivation by forming the primary defense, which 1 refer to as the fantasy bond. ... The
fantasy bond, originally an imagined fusion with the mother or primary parenting figure, is
highly effective as a defense because a human being's capacity for imagination provides
partial gratification of needs and reduces tension. This leads to a pseudoindependent
posture, and the more an individual comes to rely on fantasy, the less he or she will seek or
be able to accept gratification from other people in real relationships.
Id.
249
AIME CESAIRE, CAHIER D'UN RETOUR AU PAYS NATAL 56 (Editions Presence Africaine 1983) (1939).
The poetic language is idiosyncratic, but loosely translated means, "and each day that the black is
inferior, mean, barren, stupid, dispersed, the more distant from himself, the more self-deluded, the less
in touch with himself-I accept, I accept all of that." The play on words-plus, moin, etc.-suggests a
tension between the pregnancy and the emptiness of the epithets. I am grateful to Robert Blauvelt for
his insights in the translation of this passage.
250
See generally TODD, supra note 36, at 6-13. Todd catalogues the work of others who have charted
this decline (as well as those who suggest the opposite). Included among the "structural antiAmericans" are Noam Chomsky and Benjamin Barber; those suggesting a "moderate vision" of
American power and the "inexorable reduction of its power within a world of rising populations and
economic development" are Paul Kennedy, Samuel Huntington, Zbignew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger,
and Robert Gilpin. See id. at 6-7.
251
CHARLES KUPCHAN, T.HE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE 7 {1994).
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see the border as less stable than the law's promise of redemption (and with
it, my ethical action) may connote.
In this Article I have suggested that there is a link between the larger
relations of state or national power and the more immediate relation
between the subject and the other within the ethical discourse. I have
examined this relationship between the self and other, the ethical "I" and
the violence outside, as the interplay of various subterranean desires and
imperatives (discourse on genocide). The discourse is inscribed with our
investment in the border between self and other; the border enables us to
see the suffering of the other, to imagine the ethical, and to configure or
suppress our complex desires and projections.
The border protects us from confronting those complex desires, but at
the cost of an encounter with the other in his or her alterity. The border as
resistance to the encounter is itself invested with a sense of its necessity: to
maintain security and safety, to ratify my innocence, to legitimate my moral
stance toward the world, and to secure my power. If it is true that the more
my power is threatened, and hence the more my walls will be bolstered and
policed, then since the discourse is only possible with the expulsion
(exportation) of violence as other-what Hardt and Negri describe as the
"omni-crisis"-the self will increasingly cleave to a fantasy of safety and
security increasingly find itself, as Cesaire puts it, "plus separe de soimeme."252 In its solitude, its ethical address to the other-the instinct of
love-will engender the replicative corruption of the erotic, specular
investment in the other's death, its ultimate escape.
Thus, self-alienation is not only a suppression of self-aggression253 due
to a frustrated desire for fusion and transcendence, but is also the source of
the exclusion that creates the very conditions of rule that enable selfconfiguration as stable and strong. I have suggested two alternative
theories for interrupting this narrative of stability, each of which partakes of
the stable model but requires a return to the self, to its own antagonistic or
alienated violence in the passionate embrace of self-creation. This is the
terrifying proposition advanced by both religious and secular altemativesterrifying because, as Firestone has noted, the resistance to change is
deeply embedded since the patterns of alienation function, over time, as the
substitute for a sense of the connectedness that has always seemed, in any
event, elusive. 254
In short, my question has been: what are we really saying and doing as
we engage in the semantic debate? What is the meaning of genocide? I
have discussed the libidinal investments pursuant to the discourse that
characterize it as a kind of code, and cast the law Uuridical discourse) as a
vessel producing and containing (or attempting to) a complex of fears,
252

CESAIRE, supra note 249.
See, e.g., FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 33 (aggression as derived from frustration).
254
Id. "The core of resistance is the fear of giving up the primary fantasy and being left feeling alone.
Even though negative thoughts or voices are destructive, they are a form of companionship, and
resistance represents a fear of losing that companionship." Id.
253
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hopes, frustrations, and desires. The discourse determines the ethical, my
ethical, self.
Finally, then, at stake in the "'semantic debate," if we are serious about
avoiding harm to others, is the potential for reclaiming the erotic from its
infibulated fixation on death, and reimagining the erotic as the domain of
love. It requires excavating and confronting the deeply ambivalent desire
for the destruction of the other as the sign of a will to stability and
permanence. If we take Cesaire's advice and accept alterity, the horrible
prospect of mass slaughter and suffering in distant countries will not
vanish. People have always killed, and they always will. But the
persuasiveness of a simplified juridical story of genocide as the chaos "out
there," having nothing to do with me, calling me merely to redemption,
may become attenuated. What I do, how I see and know the suffering of
others, matters. And it will matter more as the world grows smaller.
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